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Consumer Legislation and the Poor
The Poor as Consumers
A family's standard of living is a function of both the size of its
income and the way in which that income is spent.' It is an error in
theory but easy in practice to conclude that low income alone causes
poverty2 -tacitly assuming that the poor allocate their money in the
same way, and pay the same prices at the same sorts of stores, as would
a middle class consumer whose income was suddenly reduced. In re-
ality the poor buy different goods and services at different stores for
different prices, and this has a profound effect on their standard of
living-compounding, preserving and deepening their poverty.
Both national and local anti-poverty efforts have been largely con-
cerned with increasing income. Of the total OEO budget for fiscal 1966
of $1.5 billion, only $1.4 million has been allocated to consumer pro-
grams-less than one tenth of one per cent.3 This concentration on
what the poor earn rather than on how they spend their money has
been and remains a serious mistake:
(1) Often it is less expensive to help a family save a given amount
of money than to help them achieve an equal increase in in-
come.4 This is especially true of a family which is and iill
remain on welfare.
1. The average American is far less adept at spending money than he is at earning it.
Mitchell, The Backward Art of Spending Money, 2 Am. EcoN. REv. 269 (1912). The ineptneqs
of the individual consumer contrasts sharply with the purchasing techniques of business
and government. Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 Mzcn. L. RE%. 1203 (196 ).
2. E.g., M. HI-CuTm'oN, THE OsnRa AMERIcA (1963).
3. Interview with Walter S. Valverde, Community Services Division, OEO, in Washing-
ton, D.C., July 21, 1966. An IBM "print out" of 1956 OEO programs listed grants for
consumer projects totalling $1,399,996. Before a House Subcommittee three months later,
OEO suddenly discovered it was spending $8.5 million, still less than 17 of its annual
budget. This figure may have been arrived at by including the grants for "housing and
home management." Whichever the correct figure, Congressman Rosenthal's comment
at the hearing was equally appropriate: "Not very encouraging, is it?" N.Y. Times, Oct.
11, 1966, at 39, col 8. In New York City, for example, two major proposals for consumer
action programs were submitted to OEO. That made by Mobilization for Youth was
rejected. As of September, 1966, the other proposal was in serious jeopardy, its originator
having resigned in a dispute with the director of Youth in Action. A proposal by the
United Settlement Houses for City Funding was scrapped several years earlier for political
reasons.
4. See note 157 infra.
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(2) Many of the people not reached by the major income increasing
efforts such as the Job Corps and the campaign for equal oppor-
tunity in employment could be helped by a consumer program.1
(3) A serious number of those low income consumers who do have
employment continue to lose it because their wages are gar-
nished and their employers refuse to do the necessary book-
keeping.6
(4) The benefits of increased income may be dissipated through
poor spending habits.
7
(5) The riots in Harlem, Watts and Philadelphia resulted in part
from the exploitation of the poor consumer; the arson and loot-
ing was directed almost exclusively at those businesses associated
with sharp selling practices, excessive prices, exorbitant credit
charges, or poor quality merchandise and service.8
Thus anti-poverty efforts must not only aim at raising the income of
the target population, but also at increasing the amount and quality
of the goods and services which that income provides.
New Legislation and Old Realities
Recent years have witnessed a marked growth in national and local
concern with consumer problems.9 President Kennedy appointed a
5. See also E. Peterson, Equality in the Marketplace 2 (remarks prepared for delivery
by Mrs. Esther Peterson, Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs, before
the national convention of the NAACP, Los Angeles, July 7, 1966; on file, in Yale Law
Library) [hereinafter cited as Equality in the Marketplace] ("[P]rotecting a man's right to
a fair exchange in the marketplace is only an extension of his indisputable right to a
fair exchange for his labor').
6. Equality in the Marketplace 7; PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CONSUMER INTEREST, THE
MOST FOR THEIR MONEY 7 (1965) [hereinafter cited as THE MosT rOR Tuin MONEY]
H. BLACK, Buy Now, PAY LATER 145 (1961) [hereinafter cited as BuY Now, PAY LA'rr];
D. CAPLovrrz, THE POOR PAY MORE 21, 157, 166 (1963) [hereinafter cited as TE PooR
PAY MORE]; Hearings on S. 750 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 287 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on 9. 750]; many
of the "consumer aides" in the Bedford-Stuyvesant poverty program lost their last jobs
because of such garnishments. Interview with Gladys Aponte, Director of the Bedford-
Stuyvesant Youth-in-Action Consumer Project, in New York City, August 5, 1966. New
York now has a law preventing such dismissals. N.Y. Civ. PRACexE LAw & RuLES § 5252
(1966). See also, Hearings on H.R. 7179 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on
H.R. 7179].
7. Equality in the Marketplace 12.
8. Equality in the Marketplace 11; Interview with Walter S. Valverde, Community
Services Division, OEO, in Washington, D.C., July 21, 1966; L. BERSON, CAsE STUDY OF A
RIOT: THE PHILADELPHIA STORY 30 (1966); THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 113, 192,
282 (1964). A detailed study on this problem was prepared for the National Crime Com-
mission. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1966, at 39, col. 4.
9. The debate over increased government aid to the consumer has been nothing if not
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Special Assistant for consumer affairs and a number of consumer ad-
visory groups.10 Several states, most notably New York" and Massa-
chusetts,'2 have appointed or designated special government officials
to deal with consumer problems. Both federal' 3 and state t1 officials
have expressed interest in the problems of the poor consumer.
The most significant new legislation proposals have been informa-
tional.' 5 The truth-in-lending bills would require that the cost of
passionate. The case for such legislation, particularly to aid the underprivileged, was
aptly put by Senator Robert Kennedy.
The disadvantages of the poor extend to every contact they have with the world of
commerce. The quality of their food is lower, and the prices they pay are often
higher. The interest rates they pay are higher. They are more often the victims of
high-pressure tactics of deceitful salesmen. And they are more frequently casualties
of the various laws that protect the producing interests of our society.
Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 6, at 125. Using words dear to the heart of these
interests, Senator Magnuson attacked certain sections of the Truth in Packaging Bill
(then S. 985, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966)).
These provisions of the bill reflect one of two views-both profoundly distasteful-
that our citizens are gullible, incompetent, uncomprehending, and irresponsible, or
else that the American businessman is deceitful, exploitative, or corrupt. It is an
approach that regards our people, particularly the housewife-consumer, as childlike
and helpless; so confused that she requires the benevolent but firm guidance of a
wise government . . . . This approach is demeaning, and in relation to business,
morbid.
112 CoNG. Ec. 11,508 (daily ed. June 2, 1966). See also 112 CoNG. REc. 12,213 (daily cd.
June 9, 1966). Regarding pressures brought to bear on legislators by the producers, see
Hart, Can Federal Legislation Affecting Consumers' Economic Interests Be Enacted?, 64
MicIH. L. REV. 1255 (1966).
10. P MSFDNTUL MESSAGE ON CONSUMEaR LEGISLATION 5 (1962), reprinted in Hearings
On S. 1740 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong.,
2d Sess. 206 (1962). See also 114 U. PA. I. REv. 395, 438-40 (1966). Both have been retained
under President Johnson. PSImFNTAL MmS ON CONSUMER LEGCISLATION (1965); PrEsI-
DENTiAL MSSAGE ON CoNsU mER L.GisATIo.N (1966) (reprinted in Hearings on H.R. 7179,
supra note 6, at 22-29); Exec. Order No. 11,136, 3 C.F.R. 110 (196-i Supp.); cf. N.Y. Times,
Dec. 16, 1966, at 30. The powers of both the Special Assistant and the advisory groups
have been regrettably limited. See generally Symposium on Consumer Protection, 64 Mimi.
L. Rav. 1197 (1966); Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 6, at 11.
11. In 1954 Governor Harriman appointed as his special counsel for consumer affairs
Dr. Persia Campbell, who held a similar position under President Roosevelt. Interview
with Dr. Campbell in New York City, July 15, 1966. Governor Rockefeller did not appoint
a comparable official, but in 1958 a Consumer Frauds and Protection Bureau was estab-
lished in the Department of Law.
New York appears to be the first city to establish a comprehensive consumer program.
See Draft of an Executive Order Setting Up a New York City Council on Consumer Affairs,
March 1967, on file in Yale Law Library.
12. Cf. MAssAcHusrrs CoNsusmR' COUNCIL, A CoNsusrlst's BiLL OF RicIrTs (19q6). At
least 16 other states have established such bureaus. NATiONAL Bm-rm BusuwasS BUnRAu,
CONsuMER FRAuD BunrAus 1 (1964); Eisenberg, You Can Get Your Money Back, RSEADMs'
DIGEsr, Feb. 1964, at 131, 135; Consumer Frauds, 114 U. PA. L. RE. 395, 430 & n.265 (1966).
13. Cf. Equality in the Marketplace 3.
14. E.g., Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 6, at 186-93 (statement of Barnett I.vy,
Assistant Attorney General of New York in charge of Consumer Frauds and Protection
Bureau).
See letter to Eric Schnapper from Lewis M. Feldstein, Assistant to the Mayor of Ne=
York, March 20, 1967, on file in Yale Law Library.
15. Most of the other proposals have been protective measures concerned with health
and safety along the lines of most pre-1960 consumer legislation. See generally Barber,
Government and the Consumer, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1203, 1210-15 (1966); Peterson, Repre-
senting the Consumer Interest in the Federal Government, 64 MIici. L. REv. 1323 (1966).
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credit, either in dollars,'0 simple annual interest 17 or both, 8 be re-
vealed to the consumer. Truth-in-packaging proposals would provide
additional information on labels and packages of consumer goods.10
These proposals, which have yet to provoke great enthusiasm from
either Congress 20 or the state legislatures, are adapted to deal with a
special problem in a highly specific model.
Generally, the law presupposes a consumer equipped to deal with
the business community on at least equal terms. This consumer has
three essential characteristics:
(1) He knows that he should and wants to shop around for best buys
when purchasing goods and services.
(2) He is competent to decide which product offers the greatest
value for the least money.
(3) He knows his legal rights (and liabilities) in the event of a post-
sale legal conflict with the seller, and is prepared to use all
available tools in such a conflict.
Only such consumers can avoid repeated "bad buys" and insure the
competition among businessmen which keeps prices at a reasonable
level while assuring continued high quality.2 1
Informational legislation does not question the general accuracy of
President Johnson's latest consumer proposals are almost entirely protective. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 12, 1967, at 1, 4.
16. Forty-six states require such information. B. CusAN, TRENDS IN CONStItRR CREmr
LEGISLATIoN 293-300, chart 17, col. IVg (1965) [hereinafter cited as TRENDS IN CoNsutERn
CREDI LEGIsLATION]. In the wake of the apparent failure of the Truth in Lending Bill,
note 18 infra, the FTC is considering prohibiting as "unfair and deceptive" the failure
of a merchant to inform the consumer of the credit cost in dollars. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28,
1966, at 7, col. 6. In view of the congressional inaction this may raise constitutional
questions. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
17. Three states require only the interest rate. TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEcISLATI0o
293-300, chart 17, col. IVg.
18. Only two states presently require both. id.; Mass. Retail Instrument Sales &
Service Act, § 9C(10)-(11), CCH INSTAL. CREDIT GumE 1161 (1966). This information
would have been required by Senator Douglas' Truth in Lending Bill, S. 2275, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965). The bill, like its predecessors, died in committee. Interview with Senator
Douglas' legislative aide in Washington, D.C., July 18, 1965. See Ill CoNo. Rte. 15,848
(daily ed. July 12, 1965) (remarks of Senator Douglas). The prospects for passage remain
dim. Equality in the Marketplace 14.
19. E.g., Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 80 Stat. 1296 (1966).
20. Hart, Can Federal Legislation Affecting Consumers' Economic Interests Be
Enacted?, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1255 (1966).
21. "Informed consumers are essential to the fair and efficient functioning of a free
market economy." Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, § 2, 80 Stat. 1296 (1966); 111 CoNG.
Ric. 15,849 (daily ed. July 12, 1965) (remarks of Senator Douglas). For a detailed
exposition see the remarks of Senator Hart in Hearings on S. 985 Before the Senate Comm,
on Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 89-28, at 720 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
on S. 985]. The proponents of this model admit that even such ideal consumers will occa-
sionally be "taken" by an unscrupulous merchant and find themselves without effective
legal recourse. See, e.g., Consumer Frauds, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 395 (1966).
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this model, but assumes a very particular sort of deviation: the absence
of a specific sort of knowledge needed to make "best buys."2' Once
provided, that information will by itselrfe return consumers to their
rightful place 24 as all-powerful sovereigns of the retail market and re-
store (if it was ever really absent) vigorous competition.25
Whatever its validity for the middle class, this model is almost al-
ways inapplicable to the purchases of the poor. Low income consumers
normally lack all the model characteristics:
(1) Belief in Comparative Shopping: Low income consumers are
often not aware that they could get more for their money by
visiting a number of stores, particularly those outside their im-
mediate neighborhood.20 Those who are may still not be in-
22. Even opponents of informational legislation at times tacitly admit that there is
such a lack of information. See III CONG. REc. 15,849 (daily ed. July 12, 1965) (remarks
of Senator Douglas). It does not appear to have occurred to either the proponents or
opponents of this type of legislation that the lack of knowledge may reflect and result
from a lack of motivation. See p. 767 infra.
23. If consumers had an effective yardstick with which to measure the cost of credit,
we would restore price competition within the credit industry. High-cost firms would
have to become more efficient to stay in business.
Ill CONG. R c. 15,851 (daily ed. July 12, 1965) (remarks of Senator Douglas). "Knowledge
is the key to the consumer problem." Barber, Government and the Consumer, 64 Micn.
L R-v. 1203, 1227 (1966). More explicit statements of this view make its presuppositions
dearer:
The Massachusetts Legislature has provided a built-in restraint, forcing merchants
to tell customers what the credit so cheerfully extended really costs them. This is an
average of seventeen per cent, I am informed, which should make all but the hopeless
think tvice before they induIe in unnecessary and imprudent purchases.
Casey, Legislature Redeems a Virtue, Boston Sunday Herald, May 22, 1966, reprinted in
MAss. CoNsU6CaM COUNcit, A CONs umR's BILL OP lIGHTS (196). Unfortunately "the
helpless" may prevail in low income areas; in New York such purchases continue despite
a long standing cash disclosure law and a lower ceiling on credit charges. See p. 762 infra.
24. We believe that the American consumer is intelligent and knows what he or she
wants. The freedom to choose not to buy is a powerful weapon, and the consumer
will exercise that right in an intelligent fashion if he is not fairly treated.
The facts of business life are that competition is so intense and the consumer to
much the "boss" that no manufacturer would risk bringing a new product to the
market without offering a solid value to the consumer that will lead to repeat orders,
without which no items can commercially exist.
Hearings on S. 985, supra note 21, at 67-68 (statement of D. Beryl Manischewitz on behalf
of the National Association of Manufacturers). Opponents of these bills argue that the
consumer has never ceased to control the market in this way. 112 CoNG. REc. 11,506-07
(daily ed. June 2, 1966), 12,172, 12,213 (daily ed. June 9, 1966). The business community's
enthusiasm for the use of economic force by the consumer tends to disappear when that
force is mobilized outside of congressional hearings. Cf. N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 1966, at
96 (full page advertisement by Good Housekeeping magazine protesting the supermarket
boycott as "unfair').
25. "[The truth-in-lending bill] .. will invigorate competition and thus encourage
more efficiency with, in the end, an added benefit to consumers in the form of cheaper
credit." AFL-CIO, IN YouR INrinasr 9 (undated); see remarks of Senator Douglas, quoted
supra note 23.
26. See Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 6, at 114 (testimony of Cemoria D. Johnson,
Director, Washington, D.C. Bureau, National Urban League). Since the prices within a
low income area are not likely to vary greatly, and since they will substantially exceed
the prices for comparable items in middle income shopping areas, a low income consumer
who does not shop outside his area in effect does not shop around at all. See note 61 in!ra.
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clined to shop around for good values;2 7 they search, if at all,
for other things. (A) Low income consumers usually shop pri-
marily for credit.28 This is particularly true for purchases of
expensive durables, 29 and for purchases by welfare recipients
during the last few days before the arrival of a new check, when
they have run out of cash and must rely on credit from the local
"bodega" or grocery store if they are to eat.30 (B) Low income
consumers are frequently concerned to satisfy non-material needs
by their purchases: status-seeking3l and escapism heavily influ-
ence their buying patterns. And unlike more affluent consumers,
the poor cannot satisfy such needs without neglecting essential
goods and services. (C) Many of the poor are shy and unwilling
27. See Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 6, at 114, 170. In fact the problems of
middle income consumers may not be appreciably different from those of the poor. See
p. 767 infra.
28. The poor seek small down and subsequent payments and a long period of time
to pay off the entire debt, but they show little interest in the dollar or annual interest
rate cost of the credit. See THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X 192 (1964).
29. Virtually every furniture and appliance store on 125th Street in central Harlem
has at least one sign advertising the availability of credit. Survey by the author. See also
BuY Now, PAY LATER 126. Often the amount of goods which a low income consumer will
purchase at a given store depends largely on the amount of credit offered to him. Tim
POOR PAY MORE 19.
30. Interview with Miss Rina Garst, director of the Mobilization for Youth consumer
program, in New York City, July 10, 1966. See also THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X
12 (1964).
31. Hearings on HR. 7179, supra note 6, at 114; Hearings on S. 2755 Before a Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 116 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on S. 2755] (a woman in a public housing project bought a panel to
cover plumbing under her sink after the peddler pointed out "that all of the other
neighbors had bought it and she wouldn't want her kitchen to be less attractive than
theirs."). See also Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 6, at 171 ($8 million worth of
Cadillacs were sold in Harlem in 1965).
The problem is of course aggravated by modern advertising techniques. See, e.g.,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 1966, at 30. The poor have no monopoly on this failing. Cf. V.
PACKARD, THE STATus SEEKERS (1959).
A related problem arises from the low income consumer's desire to acquire the trappings
of the American Dream of middle class prosperity, trappings which television, movies and
advertisements constantly remind him that the rest of the country already has, Hearings
on S. 750, supra note 6, at 267-68; Hearings on S. 2755, supra, at 103; THE POOR PAY Mont
12-14, 41 (this study was limited to New York City, but the President's Committee on
Consumer Interests has concluded that its findings were representative of the situation
in many major cities. THE MOST FOR THEm MONEY 6). In the summer of 1966 welfare
recipients picketed New York City Hall demanding, among other things, enough money
to buy new rather than used furniture. At the same time radio station WABC, whose
listening audience contains many low income consumers, was advertising land in New
Jersey, suggesting that now the "good life" could be bought on credit ($5 down and $2 a
week), and that "ordinary working folk" could have homes of their own and commute.
Cleverly hidden in the advertisement was the fact that to obtain the bargain rates
quoted one had to buy not one plot but eight.
It should be noted that different income groups have different ideas not only as to
what items will enhance their status, but also as to what items are essential trappings of
the American Dream. V. PACEAD, THE STATUs SEEKERS (1959). New York City poor often
own flamingo bordered mirrors and false cabinets which would be unlikely to find their
way into middle class homes. THE POOR PAY MORE 60-61 (21 per cent of the low income
consumers surveyed owned both).
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to deal with strangers, preferring instead to trade with local
people whom they already know,32 and who are more likely to
be personable33 and speak their language.3 4 Thus the tradition
of comparative shopping, accepted in theory and at times in
practice by the middle class, is largely unknowm among low in-
come consumers;35 frequently the poor purchase food or durables
without even inquiring as to their price.a
(2) Ability to Pick Out the Best Buy: Low income consumers gen-
erally lack the technical knowledge needed to choose among
consumer durables such as appliances or cars; they are usually
less educated, 37 less likely to read publications such as Consumer
Reports,38 and generally less able to make rational choices among
32. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(the defendant, a welfare recipient, had been dealing with the plaintiff-merchant for
almost five years).
33. Equality in the Marketplace 5; Tan fosr FOR TaitR MONEY 6; PnocEr in Ns: Co.-
FERENCE ON CONSUMER ACTION AND THE WAt ON PovERTY 46 (1955) (remarks of David
Borden, Director, Block Development Project, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGs];
Hearings on S. 2755, supra note 31, at 112 (woman who knew she could get a bank loan
nevertheless went to a finance company she knew was more expensive beause she didn't
want to be "bothered by all those questions'). Merchants in low income areas now make
a substantial and usually successful effort to make their customers feel at case. Salesmen
insist on dealing with any potential customer on a first name basis. Tir PooR PAY MoRE
20. See the ads in any N.Y. Daily News, e.g., Aug. 11, 1966, at 47 (salesmen mentioned by
first name only). This is also true of peddlers, who may deal with a family for many
years and come to be regarded as a close personal friend. Tim PooR PAY MORE 61.
34. TnE POOR PAY MoR 19-20.
35. Cf. "From my experience I would say that the concept of individual thrift and
frugality is dying out with depressing rapidity." Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 6,
at 170 (statement of David Borden, Director, Block Communities, Inc., East Harlem).
36. The problem is so widespread that the Mobilization for Youth consumer project
felt called upon to remind shoppers to check prices before buying. MomuzAr1ioN FOR
YOUTH, TaE CliOxcELEss SHOPPER: A COMPARATIVE SHOPPLNG REvIEW OF THE LoWR E.AST
SIDE 2 (1966). The problem is far from limited to the poor. See, e.g., Peterson, Pennywise
Teenagers, 2 AMERCAN EDUCATION 24 (1966).
37. TH POOR PAY MOan 14, 189. Even the education given non-dropouts is of uncertain
value. Several years after graduation a young man wrote his former high school principal,
I want to know why you and your teachers did not tell and teach about life and the
hard, critically practical world.... I wish I had been taught.., paying of a small
mortgage ... the chemistry of food, carpentry, how to budget and live within the
budget, the value of insurance, how to figure interest when borrowing money and
paying it back in small installments ... how to detect shoddy goods .... how to be
thrifty, how to resist high-pressure salesmanship, how to buy economically and intel-
ligently, and the danger of installment buying.
CoNSUMem EDUCATION Coramrrrc, CONSU1MR EDUCATION IN LiNcoLN HIGH SCaKooL 5 (19 5).
Many of the urban poor who have moved into the city from outside areas have lower
educational levels than their neighbors. Hearings on S. 2755, supra note 31, at 105. Not
surprisingly, the first major high school consumer education program in the country
was in the well-to-do Westchester County suburb of New York City. Id. Beginning vith
the 1966-67 academic year similar programs will be set up throughout the state. Because
it has autonomy from the State Board of Education, the New York City schools will not
have such a program. Interview with David Schoenfeld of Lincoln High School, in
Washington, D.C., July 22, 1966.
38. See Consumer Frauds, 114 U. PA. L. R~v. 395, 448 n.447, 449 nA49 (1966); 110
CONG. REc. 1960 (1964) (Presidential Message). Most state and federal publications are
available only upon request, usually written. Naturally those most likely to know about
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products than their middle income counterparts.8 D In addition
these consumers are often unable to recognize even poor quality
food and clothing-largely because that is the only quality that
they have ever had.
40
(3) Freedom to Engage in Comparative Shopping: Those low in-
come consumers aware that they should engage in comparative
shopping and able to make an intelligent choice among a num-
ber of goods or services may nevertheless fail to do so. They
feel, usually correctly, that they cannot get the credit they need
outside of their own neighborhood,4 1 and, in some cases (such
as buying food on credit) that they cannot get it from anyone
other than the local retailer with whom they are already well
acquainted.42 This pressure to shop within the local business
community is compounded by shyness, the need to care for
children, and the inconvenience of a time-consuming trip to a
more affluent area. Thus local merchants have an essentially
captive market, and experience no meaningful competition with
businesses in middle and upper income areas.43 An ability and
willingness to shop outside of the local neighborhood is of great
importance because of the differences in area price levels.
44
(4) Knowledge of Legal Rights and Liabilities: Most laymen lack
more than a superficial knowledge of their rights and liabilities
in a post-sale legal conflict, and rely on professional help when
conflicts arise. Many low income consumers lack even this super-
and use this opportunity are those least in need of it. Cf. SUPERINTENDENT OF DocuMENTs,
CONSUMER INFORMATION (2d ed. 1965) (a 32 page list of federal publications available on
request).
39. THE Mosr FOR THEIR MONEY 5. There are of course exceptions due to occupa.
tional factors. Car mechanics and appliance repairmen are probably the people most
qualified to buy used cars and appliances, excepting perhaps avid readers of Consuner
Reports. Such technical skills are most common among the low, but not the lowest,
income groups. Under most circumstances, on the other hand, a mechanical engineer
would be no more adept than a lawyer at choosing a used car.
40. Interview with Paul Katzoff, East Harlem Tenants Council, in New York City,
July 15, 1966.
41. Often an address is regarded as sufficient ground for the denial of credit. Hearings
on H.R. 7179, supra note 6, at 171 (statement of David Borden, Director, Block Com-
munities, Inc.). See Mobilization for Youth, Consumer Affairs Program, Feb. 22, 1966
(circular on file in the Yale Law Library). Most of the poor prefer, or feel forced, to
buy furniture or appliances on credit. THE POOR PAY MORE 98. Hearings on H.R. 7179,
supra note 6, at 190 (statement of Barnett Levy, Assistant Attorney General of New York
in charge of the Consumer Frauds and Protection Bureau).
42. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
Local food stores will usually extend credit only after a long period of acquaintance.
Interview with Helen Hall, Director, Henry Street Settlement House, in New York City,
July 30, 1966.
43. THE POOR PAY MORE 19.
44. Id. table 6.3 at 85.
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ficial knowledge,45 and of the substantial number who feel that
they have at one time or another been cheated by a merchant,
few have ever sought professional aid-only 9 per cent in a
recent survey. When asked where they would go for help if they
were being cheated by a merchant or salesman, almost two thirds
of the low income consumers interviewed replied that they did
not know. Only 10 per cent mentioned tie most significant
sources of help: private lawyers, legal aid, and small claims
court.46 More than half of those who knew of any source of help
mentioned only the Better Business Bureau, which does not en-
gage in litigation and is generally unable to offer much aid.47
Thus the consumers with the greatest need for knowledge of
their legal rights are the consumers with the greatest lack
thereof.
48
(5) Motivation: A low income consumer is profoundly different
from a middle income consumer who awoke one day ill-housed,
ill-clothed, rl-fed and ill-informed. Underlying his problems
and essential to any discussion of remedies is a crucial lack of
motivation. 49 Many of the poor who do have a conscious
desire to get more goods and services for their money have
failed so often in attempting to do so that they no longer regard
45. They do not know, for example, that they may still be liable for a debt after the
merchandise has been repossessed, or that they should protest when confronted by a
default judgment where there has been no service of process. Tim POOR PAY Morn 157-69,
189. See 2 CoLUSS. J. L. & Soc. PRoB. 1, 1-2 (1966).
46. See generally Tan POOR PAY MoRE 171-75.
47. Consumer Frauds, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 40-06 (1966). Despite this ineffectiveness
of the Better Business Bureaus in dealing with dishonest merchants, the federal govern-
ment continues to urge consumers to go to the Bureaus before seeking government help.
FTC, FicHT BACK: THE UNGENTLE ART OF SELF DEFESE (undated). The myth of merchant
self-regulation has a wide following.
48. In this respect some discussions of consumer problems are most inadequate. The
"typical" consumer discussed in Consumer Frauds, 114 U. PA. L RXv. 395, 401-03 (19I),
went to the Better Business Bureau, the district attorney, a private lawyer, and legal
aid. A more realistic appraisal of the role of law in this area was recently given by
Gladys Aponte, of Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth-in-Action. "We could have the most adequate
protective legislation for the consumer, but no protective legislation will be effective
unless the consumer is equipped to understand their [ski rights and to know, when
their [sic] rights have been violated." Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 6. at 173.
49. Tan PooR PAY MORE 171; Equality in the Marketplace 15. See also Ridgeway,
Segregated Food at the Supermarket, NEv REvuiuxc, Dec. 5, 1964, at 7. Although viola-
tions of state and city market regulations are at least as common in low income neighbor-
hoods as elsmvhere, the number of complaints from those areas to regulatory agences is
negligible, particularly in comparison to the number from middle income areas. Interview
with Hugh Marius, Executive Assistant to the Commissioner of New York City Depart-
ment of Markets, in New York City, July 30, 1966; L. BEsON, CASE STUDY or A i or: Tim
PHILADELPHIA STORY 44 (1966). See N.Y. Times, May 6, 1966, at 3. The word "apathy" is
purposely avoided here, as it is by most people working with the poor. The term sug-
gests people who are faced by great opportunities, probably comparable to those success-
fully seized upon by the speaker or his father, and who are too lazy to take advantage
of those opportunities.
753
The Yale Law Journal
the attempt as worthwhile. 0 For anyone living in poverty
an effort to change his condition involves a recognition that the
condition can be changed, and the acceptance of at least partial
responsibility inasmuch as he has made no previous effort, or
inasmuch as those efforts have failed or met with only limited
success.5 1 Undoubtedly many low income consumers pass through
several stages as their exploitation continues; their attitude de-
generates from frustration to bewilderment to resignation to an
abandonment of responsibility.5
2
Thus the typical low income consumer is not a hardened penny
pincher employing all his skill and ingenuity to stretch his meagre in-
come as far as he can. He is an increasingly frustrated and embittered
man, with $10,000 desires, $5,000 essential needs, and $2,000 income,
alternately groping for a standard of living he cannot possibly afford
and resignedly paying exorbitant prices for his daily essentials.
In sum, the new wave of informational legislation will be of little
help to the poor because it presupposes values, motivation and knowl-
edge which do not generally exist among them. The actual problem is
not just a shortage of a narrowly defined sort of information-such as
the price per pound of prepackaged food-but a total breakdown in
the function the consumer is supposed to play in the market. "Bad
buys" are the rule and price and quality competition the exception.
As one merchant in New York put it: "People do not shop in this area.
I.. it is just up to who catches him."53
50. In one reported case a Negro housewife ordered a $100 washing machine and got
a bill for $200 after it was installed. When she refused to pay the machine was taken
away, and she expressed relief that she only lost her $50 deposit and had not had to pay
the balance. THE PooR PAY MORE 147, 172. Often the poor refrain from protesting their
exploitation for fear that protest would only make things harder on them. Hearings on
S. 750, supra note 6, at 492 (statement of Annie R. Swan).
51. The problem appears at an early age. It has been suggested that compared to more
affluent white children, underprivileged Negro students show far less conviction that
their personal behavior will affect what happens to them. McKissick, Is Integration Neces.
sary? NEw RE' uauc, Dec. 3, 1966, at 34-35.
52. This lack of motivation may help to channel the poor consumer's bitterness about
his condition into antagonism towards the business community.
53. THE PooR PAY MORE 19. Despite this perhaps not-so-new reality, old myths linger,
"The consumer buys what he wants. He cannot and should not be told what to buy,
But he must be told what is available for purchase." PRESIDENTIAL MAESSAGE ON CONSUMJER
LEGISLATION (1966). This statement reflects a somewhat different view from that taken
by President Kennedy. The 1962 PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE ON CONSUMER LEGISLATION In-
cluded among the rights of the consumer "the right to choose-to be assured, wherever
possible, access to a variety of products and services at competitive prices, and in those
industries in which competition is not workable and Government regulation is substituted,
an assurance of satisfactory quality and service at fair prices." The entire low Income
area business community may or may not be an industry where competition is unwork-
able, but it certainly seems to be an industry where competition has not worked.
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Because of their dissimilarity to the ideal consumers of modem eco-
nomics and legislation, the poor pay prices for food, rent, medicine
and durables almost always exceeding those paid by the more affluent,
and usually exceeding those needed to yield a fair return on the busi-
nessman's investment. This comes about in several ways:
(1) Neighborhood Price Levels: Food stores in low income areas
consistently charge higher prices than food stores in middle and
upper income areas for comparable items. The low income con-
sumer pays betveen 5 per cent and 10 per cent more for the
same groceries purchased in his own neighborhood than does
a middle income consumer." The average small grocery store
54. MOBIL.IZATION FOR YoUrH, THm CHOICELESS SHOPPER 3 (196) (9 per cent); hf. MoRRIs,
GROCERY SHOPPING IN ,VASHINGTON, D.C. 2 (1966); Ridgeway, Segregated Food at the
Supermarket, NEv RErPUmLC, Dec. 5, 1964, at 6-7. The most detailed information is in
an as yet unpublished survey by Rina Garst of Mobilization for Youth. Interview with
Rina Garst, in New York City, July 15, 1966.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics recently completed a study of food prices and quality,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATiSTICS, A STUDY OF PRICES CHARGED IN FOOD STORES LOCAED IN
Low AND HIGHER Ixcoam AyAns or Six LARGE CmS (1966) [hereinafter cited as STUDY
oF PRICEs]. Despite the title and ostensible purpose of the STuDY Or PRaCES, the data is
tabulated in such a way as to make it extremely dilficult to ascertain whether there are
price differences between different areas, especially between stores of the same size. Only
one table (id. at 10) is arranged to permit the reader to see whether there are differences
among similar size stores, and it does not allow comparisons between small independent
stores. Notwithstanding a clear showing of a price differential between chains and large
independent stores in different areas (id. at 10) and an admission of this in the text
(id. at 9), the printed summary insists that there are no "significant" differences. The
press read only this summary, and understood it to mean there were no such price
differences at all. N.Y. Times, June 12, 1966, at 56. On no interpretation of "significant"
can this assertion be justified. Chains are said in the summary "usually" to charge less
than small independents, yet for normal quality food this is true in only 'two of the six
cities surveyed, and for low quality food it is true for only one of the six. Where the
chains do charge less than the independents it was only an average of 12 per cent, whereas
in the five cities where chains charge more in low income areas the average difference
was more than 2V per cent.
The summary asserts that the poor do pay more, but only because the small stores
where they often shop are more expensive. Although the proposition is true, see, e.g..
MOBItZArION FOR YoUrH, supra, it is not supported by the findings in the STUDY OF
PRICaS. This is due to the BLS's research methods. A "small" store was defined as one
with a gross income of less than $300,000--a figure perhaps ten times the average local
grocery store gross in low income areas. STUDY OF PRICES 2. Moreover, the survey excluded
all but "full line" groceries---stores which did not carry all or almost all of the eighteen
foods surveyed were not even visited. Id. at 3. Most of the small stores in low income
areas were thus not considered, since many of these sell only dry goods or only fruit and
vegetables, or only meat. Id. at 10 (the STUDY OF PlucEs concedes as much); MoDI.IZATIo.
FOR YOUTH, THE CHOICEEs SHOPPER 2 (1966). This exclusion is evidenced by the fact that
the STUDY failed to find many instances of food without price tags (id. at 13.14), whereas
this is the rule in small low income area stores. Ridgeway, Segregated Food at the Super-
market, NEW REPUBic, Dec. 5, 1964, at 7. Thus the usual sources of low income con-
sumer food were either excluded altogether from the government survey or they were
averaged in with atypical stores which had gross incomes in six figures. For this reason
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or "bodega" charges a median 10 per cent more than large mid-
dle income area chain stores,05 and the low income chain stores
charge about 5 per cent more than the middle income area
chains.56 There are significant price differences among branches
of the same chain, 7 reflecting in part the commission basis upon
which store managers are employed. Some other stores, such as
co-operatives 8 or private stores selling in particularly high vol-
ume 9 have prices more than 15 per cent below those predomi-
nating in the low income areas.00 Low income neighborhood
stores usually price durables 50 per cent to 100 per cent above
the going rate in more affluent areas, employing markups of
300 or 400 per cent 61 and giving commissions running as high
the most important price comparison, between normal small low income area store and
the middle income area supermarket, cannot be made.
Given the method of tabulation, the definition of "small store," and the unsupported
assertions in the summary, it is not surprising that the report was only adopted by a
9-6 vote and that three of the dissenters plan to publish separate views. N.Y. Times,
June 12, 1966, at 56. Unfortunately some usually well-informed officials seem to have
accepted the errors found in the summary of the STUDY OF PmcEs. See, e.g., Equality in
the Marketplace 4; Letter to the Author from Walter E. Duka, Information Director,
President's Committee on Consumer Interest, Aug. 12, 1966 (on file in the Yale Law
Library).
55. See sources cited note 54 supra.
56. Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 6, at 172 (statement of David Borden), 27
JEwisH SOCIAL STUDIES 45 (1965); Ridgeway, Segregated Food in the Supermarket, NEw
REPUBLIC, Dec. 5, 1964, at 6-7; Interview with Rina Garst, at Mobilization for Youth In
New York City, July 30, 1966. In the STUDY OF PRaCEs 10 it was revealed that chain
store prices vary as much as 7 per cent between areas.
57. A store in one low income area sold jaded-looking hamburger at 590 a pound-
less elderly hamburger was sold at 490 a pound in a middle-income branch of ti same
chain. Ridgeway, Segregated Food in the Supermarket, NEw REPUISLIc, Dec. 5, 1964, at
6-7. Interview with Rina Garst, in New York City, July 30, 1966. The STUDY OF PRICes
9 noted such variations but accepted statements of chain managers that this was due
to the late arrival of new price lists.
58. See MOBILIZATION FOR YouTu, THE CHOICELzSS SHOPPER 2-3 (1966). Mrs. Garst at
Mobilization for Youth found that nearby co-ops charged about 17 per cent less than
the average area prices.
59. A Shoprite store in the Bronx charges about 15 per cent less than the average
East Harlem prices, and a few residents of East Harlem travel all the way to the Bronx
to do their grocery shopping. Interview with Paul Katzoff, East Harlem Tenants' Council,
July 10, 1966.
60. It has been suggested that the differences in price levels are due to higher insurance
costs and shoplifting rates. The BLS advanced this second explanation, although no
empirical evidence was offered to substantiate it. STUDY OF PRICES, summary. It is anom-
alous that the STUDY OF PRI CEs accepts the existence of a serious pilferage problem In
low-income areas while denying the existence of price differences dependent on location
alone. The only instance in which the BLS could find that insurance was unusually
hard to get or expensive was in Watts after the 1965 riot. Id. Some time ago a consumer
boycott was used to force down prices at an East Harlem grocery. Had there been any
economic justification for the price levels the store would soon have gone into bank.
ruptcy; in fact the store did better than ever before. PROCEEDINGs 48 (remarks of David
Borden); Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 6, at 172 (statement of David Borden).
61. TnE POOR PAY MoRE 16-17, 49-57, 80-93; PROCEEDINGS 45, 46 (remarks of David
Borden); MOBILIZATION FOR YOUTH, THE CHOiEcFss SHOPPrR 8 (1966) (television prices
25 per cent to 70 per cent above list, up to 100 per cent over middle-income areas);
N.Y. BUREAU OF CONSUMER FRAUs AND PROTECTION, ANN. REP. 7 (1965) (food freezers
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as 100 per cent of the value of the goods. 0 2 Notwithstanding the
resulting preclusion of comparative shopping,63 the poor buy a
substantial portion of their furniture and appliances from door-
to-door peddlers. 64 Because of this preclusion, and because ped-
dlers prey on the least competent of the poor shoppers, peddler
prices are uniformly substantially above those of store owning
merchants.65
(2) Quality: The low value which the poor receive for their money
results not only from these above average prices, but also from
the below average quality of the goods which are sold in low
income areas. Grocery stores in the low income areas are less
sanitary than their middle income counterparts; c0 fruit and veg-
etables are more often damaged, meat commonly brown around
the edges, and milk and eggs occasionally sold past the time
recommended by the producer. 7 As with prices, variations in
the condition of food exist between stores of the same chain,
the branch in the low income area generally having the lesser
quality.68 Durables purchased by the poor are of a similarly low
sold at 167 per cent to 300 per cent above fair market value); S. MARGotus, A Guwu ro
CONsUM CREDrr 5 (Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 348, 1963) (stainless steel tableware
worth $15 sold for $65, over 300 per cent above value); Buy Now, PAY LVTn 126 (religious
medal marked up 5900 per cent over wholesale); Tire AUtroBIooPy OF MALCOL.a4 X 192
(1964); Hearings on S. 2755, supra note 31, at 101 (peddler markup over retail "conserva-
tively" estimated at 100 per cent); People v. Abbott Mfaintenance Corp., 11 App. Div. 2d
136, 139, 201 N.Y.S.2d 895, 898 (1960) (iaxing machine worth $102.90 sold for $926, more
than 800 per cent above its fair market value). Even Kenneth B. Wilson, President of
the National Better Business Bureau, has felt called upon to point out that the poor
pay markups "as high as 400% for a shoddy product that won't last half the time it
takes to pay it off." N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1966, at 30. See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1966,
at 20 (poor receive less value for the rent dollar).
62. E.g., American Home Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886
(1964).
63. See p. 781 infra.
64. More than half of the low-income families in New York City have bought some-
thing from peddlers. See generally THE POOR PAY M aE 58-80. The typical lot- income
area peddler, once thin and unshaven, has grown a paunch and makes collections in a
late model car. BuY Now, PAY LATER 131.
65. MOBLI-ZATION FaR Youtm, THE CHoIr.ySS SHOPPER 9 (1966); Tim Pooa PAY MORE
58-80. That many of the poor know they are paying peddlers higher prices and do so
anyway is indicative of the motivational problem. Cf. id. at 78, 79-80.
66. STuny OF PricEs, summary; Moreus, supra note 54, at 6.
67. STUDy OF PascFs 12-13. MOmUs, supra note 54, at 6-7; Ridgeway. supra note 54,
at 6; interview with Paul Katzoff at the East Harlem Tenants Council, in New York
City, July 15, 1966. It is nonsense to maintain, as the Srway OF PsucEs does, that the poor
do not pay more in stores of comparable size, and yet admit that the goods at the "same
price" vary in quality.
68. STuDy OF PRicrs 13; Monas, supra note 54, at 7. There have been allegations that
this variation in quality within a single chain is due to purposeful dumping of low
quality goods or items that failed to sell in middle income stores. Ridgeway, supra note
54, at 7; interview with Paul Katzoff, in New York City, July 15, 1966. The BLS "took
no position" on the dumping issue, but raised the possibility that differences in quality
were due to a slower turnover rate in low income areas or a mishandling of display
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quality; both appliances and furniture have to be replaced or
repaired frequently.69 Neighborhood stores and peddlers rarely
deal in brand name goods, in part because a markup compa-
rable to that on the low quality goods they normally sell would
make brand name goods prohibitively expensive.70 Service on
the purchased items is inadequate, warranties are rarely given,71
and the merchants often disclaim responsibility for goods, assert-
ing that the salesman is no longer with them or that the line
has been dropped.72 Often the firm is no longer even in busi-
ness, at least under the same name.3
(3) Sales Methods: A number of questionable merchant and peddler
techniques are used to maintain high prices and poor quality.
1 4
In low income areas of New York City food prices rise abruptly
and temporarily on the 1st and 16th of each month, when wel-
merchandise. No evidence is offered to support these suggestions, nor, for example, Is
any explanation offered why slow turnovers could not be compensated for by smaller
stocks. The Bureau's willingness to consider these rather exotic explanations is consistent
with its generally lenient attitude toward chain stores.
69. Hearings on S. 2755, supra note 31, at 107-08, 115 (discarded new furniture con-
stantly has to be removed from public housing; a local cobbler would not repair the
shoes of the people in the project because they were of such low quality); Mobilization
for Youth, Proposal for a Community Program in Consumer Affairs 1, June 1966, on
file in Yale Law Library; THE POOR PAY MORE 36, 39 (durables owned by the poor are
more likely to be recently purchased than those owned by the average consumer, suggest-
ing that those owned by the poor do not last as long).
70. THE POOR PAY MORE 18. Similarly the high food prices indicate low quality food
being sold at premium quality food prices. Momus, supra note 54, at 11. See also N.Y.
Times, Nov. 5, 1966, at 20 (clothing and other items).
71. 2 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 1, 2 (1966).
72. Consumer Frauds, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 397-401 (1966).
73. Id. at 400; Hearings on S. 750, supra note 6, at 126 (a New York firm had six
names and four locations in two years). One merchant in the Lower East Side, after
selling overpriced, poor quality phonographs and television sets, filed a petition in
voluntary bankruptcy and then resumed business under another name. Mobilization for
Youth, Consumer Affairs Program, April 22, 1966, on file in Yale Law Library.
74. The most critical commentators upon these practices regard them as the tech-
niques of purposeful and widespread exploitation. See generally THE POOR PAY MORE.
Others have taken milder positions, arguing, for example, that only a few businessmen
want to use these techniques, and the rest are forced to use them to compete. Consumer
Frauds, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 397 & nn.18, 20, 399 n.30 (1966); AFL-CIO, IN YoVa
INTEREsr 9 (undated); Hearings on H.R. 15,440 Before the House Comm, on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, 28 (1966) (statements of Representatives
O'Neill and Helstocki). No explanation is offered of why the Better Business Bureau,
presumably formed to deal with precisely such problems, has not acted. It has been
urged that low income area merchants are no worse than merchants generally. Equality
in the Marketplace 8-9. Fortunately for the middle income consumer this does not appear
to be the case. Some businessmen are prepared to rationalize unethical practices on the
theory that you cannot cheat an honest man. Consumer Frauds, 114 U. PA. L. RLv. 395,
397 n.20 (1966). Perhaps the most sensible approach is that suggested by Senator Hart.
It makes little difference to the economy and consumer whether price comparisons
are made difficult or impossible because of fraud, deception or only confusing prac-
tices. The seller's intent is not the important point-the practice and its effects are,
Hearings on S. 985, supra note 21, at 719. Whatever the merchant's motive, the effect and
the justice of laws curbing these practices are the same.
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fare payments are made and the poorest (and least competent)
of the poor do most of their shopping.75 Prices are not generally
marked on furniture and appliances sold in poor neighbor-
hoods,76 and the prices quoted verbally are tailored to the cus-
tomer. One recent survey found differences as great as 60 per
cent for the same item; Negro and Puerto Rican shoppers were
charged the higher amounts. 7 Both merchants and peddlers
commonly use high pressure techniques,78 while the law often
penalizes those few customers who change their minds and
revoke the contract before delivery. 9  Customers are lured
into a store by an advertised bargain which the merchant had
little or no intent of actually giving, and are talked into a much
more expensive purchase.80 Salesmen frequently misrepresent
the nature of items being sold,"' their prices,82 the nature of
documents being signed,83 and other relevant facts,84 and pur-
75. Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 6, at 174-75 (statement of Mrs. Gladys Aponte);
Interview with Dorothy Orr, Director of Bedford-Stuyvesant Youth in Action, in New
York City, Aug. 5, 1966. The problem might be solved by not mailing out all the welfare
checks at one time. Similarly the price of carp and pike in New York City ries sharply
during the Jewish High Holy Days when these items are extremely popular. Interview
with Sheldon Fink, Intern in the Office of the Mayor of New York, in New York City,
Aug. 9, 1966.
76. THE CHoIcEty.s SHorPR, supra note 65, at 8; Tim PooR PAY 'MOR 17.
77. Tan Cnozcr.as SHOPPER, supra note 65, at 8. See also Hearings on H.R. 7179,
supra note 6, at 182-83 (statement of Mrs. Florence Rice, Director of the Harlem Con-
sumer Education Council); Mobilization for Youth, Proposal for a Community Program
in Consumer Affairs 1, 4 (1966) (on file in Yale Law Library).
78. N.Y. BUREAu OF CoNsuMR FAUDs AND PRorrcnov, ANN. REP. 9 (1964); 2 COLU.
J.L. & Soc. PRoB. 1, 2 n.9 (1966); TaE POOR PAY MORE 64 (peddlers), 145 (merchants).
79. UNIFORM COMMIERcIAL CODE § 2-718(2)(b) (1962); 2 CoLu.& J.L. & Soc. Pnon. 1, 4
(1966). But cf. Mass. Retail Installment Sales & Services Act, 1A CCH INsrrT. CrEDirr
GumE 1162 (1966).
80. BuY Now PAY LATER 140-42; THE POOR PAY MoRE 143-46; Consumer Frauds, 114
U. PA. L. REv. 395, 398-99 & n.30 (1966). One New York City merchant commented, "I
don't know how we do it. We advertise three rooms of furniture for $149, and the cus-
tomers swarm in. They end up buying a $400 bedroom set for $600, and none of us
can believe how easy it is to make these sales." PRocrEINGs 7 (statement of David Cap-
lovitz). It is interesting to note that this statement was freely made several years after
New York passed a statute purporting to ban bait advertisements. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw
§ 396 (1966).
81. Reconditioned goods are commonly sold as new, Tan PooR PAY ,Mon 28, 151,
although there have been no criminal fraud prosecutions for this in New York City for
several years. Telephone interview, New York City District Attorney's Office, Aug. 2.
1966. A Brooklyn firm recently sold freezers by fraudulently telling buyers that the sale
included a complete food plan. N.Y. BUREAU Or CoNsu.tER FRAuDs AND PROTECoN, ANN.
REP. 7 (1965).
82. THE MjosT FOR THEIR MONEY 7; S. MAGouus, A GutDE to Co.susmra CREDrr 5
(1963); Tan POOR PAY MORE 147-51.
83. Buy Now, PAY LATER 137-40; PROcMmINGs 8 (remarks of David Caplovitz); N.Y.
BUREAU OF CONSUMsER FRAUDS AND PROTErnON, ANN. Rxp. 8 (196); Tan POOR PAY Mon
146.
84. One peddler selling encyclopedias told his customers that he was from their chil-
dren's schools or teachers and that the children might be expelled from school if the
encyclopedias were not purchased. Equality in the Marketplace 6; Mobilization for Youth,
Consumer Affairs Program (Apr. 22, 1966) (circular, on file in Yale Law Librar)).
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posely deliver goods other than those purchased by the cus-
tomer.8 5 Low income consumers are particularly susceptible to
these and other forms of fraud, since they are less likely to detect
it and to act to protect their rights.8 6 There is evidence to sug.
gest that low income area businessmen and merchants occasion-
ally resort to price fixing.
87
(4) Resulting Losses: The effect of area sales techniques and price
and quality levels is compounded by the low income consumer's
failure to shop around even within his neighborhood88 or to
buy in large economic quantities.89 As a result of selling prac-
tices and poor shopping habits the typical low-income consumer
is probably paying one-third to one-half more for his food than
he would if he shopped with diligence in a middle income
area.90 Durables91 probably cost the poor at least one and one-
85. Thx POOR PAY MORE 151-53; 2 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 1, 4 (1966).
86. THE MOST FOR THEIR MONEY vii, 6, 7. Also responsible are outdated legal doc-
trines putting the defrauding merchant in a different position than an ordinary thief.
See Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960, 38 TExAs L. REv. 439 (1960).
87. Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 6, at 170 (statement of David Borden); L.
BERSON, CASE STUDY OF A RIOT: THE PHILADELPHIA STORY 34-35 (1966). A group of poor
consumers in West Virginia, unhappy with the high cost of food, set up their own gro-
cery store. One spokesman for the group referred to the store as an instance of "poor
power." A local businessman explained it was "all a Communist plot." Whatever it was,
within a week food prices in the other area stores tumbled sharply. N.Y. Times, Dec.
16, 1966, at 31. Why the prices had theretofore been so much higher may be a matter
of speculation, but tacit price fixing is perhaps the most obvious explanation.
88. THE MOST FOR THEIR MONEY 5. The need for credit may force the poor to shop
at the local grocery store where they are well known. THE CHoIcELEss SHoPPiER, supra
note 65, at 2; STUDY OF PRICES 17; Mobilization for Youth, Proposal for a Community
Program in Consumer Affairs 1 (June, 1966) (on file in Yale Law Library). Failure to
shop outside of the neighborhood is of even greater importance, since discount food and
appliance stores are generally restricted to middle income areas. STUDY oF PRICES 10,
THE MOST FOR THEIR MONEY 5; THE POOR PAY MORE 85, 87; PROcEEDINGs 25-26 (state-
ment of Paul Katzoff). For proposals to alter this situation see N.Y. Times, June 12,
1966, at 56, col. 1.
89. THE MOST FOR THEIR MONEY 5; STUDY OF PRICES, summary; TIE CuloIlLrss
SHOPPER, supra note 65, at 3; Ridgeway, supra note 54, at 7.
90. Fifteen per cent could be saved by shopping at middle income area discount
stores or co-ops. See note 60 supra. Fifteen per cent could probably be saved by simply
choosing the best buy in a given store. See 112 CoNG. REc. 12,169-72 (1966) (even college-
educated shoppers with an unusually long time to shop overpay by 10 per cent). Another
5 per cent saving could be accomplished by buying in large quantities and avoiding the
use of credit. A consumer could thus buy equivalent food for 65 per cent of what he
is now paying. The cash saving would be substantial, since the poor spend almost a third
of their income on food. THE MOST FOR THEIR MONEY 2; BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
CONSUMER EXPENDITURES AND INCOiE, NEW YORK, NEiv YORE, 1960-61, at 9 (BLS Rep.
No. 237-54, 2d Advance Rep., 1963).
91. Despite differences in funds available for current consumption, the low income
consumer is at least as active a purchaser of appliances as is his middle income counter-
part. THE POOR PAY MORE 37-38. Expenditures on furniture, however, vary with income.
See CONsuSzER EXPENDITURES, supra note 90, at 9. Total expenditures on furniture and
appliances vary with income; since expenditures on appliances do not vary greatly, It
must be furniture purchases that cause this difference. This may reflect in part the
fact that when furniture breaks or wears down it may be used or repaired by the owner.
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half to twro times as much as they would if they bought in more
affluent neighborhoods, especially at discount houses. -2
Credit and Loans
Two thirds of the purchases of major durables made by low income
consumers involve the use of credit or loans, a portion comparable to
that for middle income consumers. Seventy-five per cent of low income
consumers have used credit for at least one purchase of a major dur-
able, and a lesser number of them use it for food or clothing. 3 Most
low income families are presently in debt and will remain in debt;,"
for them the only bill which never comes is the last one. The cost
of credit is thus an important element in the budgets of most low
income families.95
Lending practices vary widely with the relevant state laws. New York
has perhaps the best system of credit and loan regulation in the coun-
try;96 the problems in other states are generally worse. State law sets
maximum rates for both credit"7 and loans 8 in New York, with penal-
ties for overcharges. 99 The Retail Installment Sales Act voids any
clause in a credit purchase agreement which provides for an accelera-
tion of payment in the absence of default, a power of attorney, a con-
fession of judgment, an authorization to breach the peace in repossess-
ing goods, or a waiver of defenses against the seller,100 and provides
that the contract must dearly state the cost of the goods and of the
credit.' 0 ' "Balloon payments"-progressively larger payments often in-
tended to force the purchaser into default-are discouraged -02 All
A broken television or washing machine, on the other hand, must either be replaced
or repaired by a commercial serviceman.
92. See note 61 supra.
93. See generally THE POOR PAY MORE 94-104. See also SruDY OF PuCEs 17-18 (grocery
store credit).
94. THE POOR PAY MORE 105-15.
95. One couple agreed to buy a "custom made" orthopedic mattress and box spring
for $22 apiece. With taxes and carry, delivery and credit charges the final cost was 9247.
Equality in the Marketplace 6. This is also true of middle income consumers. One family
with an annual income of $15,000 was paying $1,150 a year in interest and finance
charges. MARtGoLrus, supra note 82, at 3.
96. Hearings on S. 750, supra note 6, at 125, 249. See generally TR.,os L'- Co.s;u.RM
CREDIT LEGISLATION.
97. N.Y. Pins. PROP. LAW § 404 (1962). In states without such regulations credit charges
commonly run as high as 275 per cent. U.S. DEr. OF AGrICuLTURE, A Gumw To BUDGETrNG
FOR rmm FAmILY 13 (1965).
98. N.Y. BANKING LAw § 352 (1964).
99. N.Y. PEas. PROP. LAw § 414 (1962) (credit); N.Y. BANIo L&W § 358 (1962) (loans).
100. N.Y. P.Rs. PROP. LAW § 403(3)(b)-(g) (196).
101. N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 402(3)(b)(l), (7) (1962).
102. The provisions for such payments must be dearly stated, N.Y. PZnS. Pnor. LAW
§ 402(3)(b)(10) (1962). and the permissible interest rate is lower. N.Y. PERs. PRop. LAw
§ 404(3) (1962). Nine other states restrict balloon payments. TRENDs Im CoxsumEns CREDrr
LEGISLATION 293-300 (chart 17, column IV-1).
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these provisions have, however, fallen far short of adequately protecting
the low income consumer.
The ceilings on credit charges are high. In theory the maxima are
10 per cent for the first $500 and 8 per cent for the rest of the debt,
but since the interest can be computed in advance and added to the
amount due ("discounted") the actual ceilings are close to 20 per cent
and 16 per cent where the debt is to be paid within one year.103 Even
these limits, however, do not appear to affect significantly the cost of
low income consumer credit. Local stores frequently charge a higher
price for goods being sold on credit in lieu of being able to openly
charge a higher credit fee. 10 4 Testimony before the Senate Committee
studying the Truth-in-Lending Bill suggested that Negroes and Puerto
Ricans are systematically and automatically charged a higher rate of
interest than whites, and this regardless of their individual credit rat-
ing.105 This pattern is confirmed by the finding that non-whites buying
on credit from local dealers and peddlers pay higher prices (i.e., higher
covert credit charges) than do low income whites making similar pur-
chases, although the non-whites are not substantially more likely to
default on their obligations. 0 6 The high de facto rates reflect not only
deliberate exploitation, but also the loss incurred when the customer's
promise to pay is sold to a bank or finance company for 70 per cent
or 80 per cent of its face value. 07
In other instances exorbitant interest rates on credit or loans involve
violations of the letter as well as the spirit of the law. Senator Douglas'
committee, several years after the passage of the Retail Installment
Sales Act, discovered credit charges in excess of 100 per cent in New
103. N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 404 (1962). The Internal Revenue Service allows a de-
duction for income used to pay interest on loans, but in practice limits this to an interest
rate of 6-10 per cent. Hearings on S. 750, supra note 6, at 200. This is one of the more
glaring instances of government action being totally out of touch with the realities of
the consumer market.
104. See generally THE POOR PAY MoRE 17. In other areas of the country merchants
disguise interest charges in the form of investigation and other "fees." Ross, When You
Borrow, When You Buy-Watch Those Interest Ratesl, READERS DIGrST, Nov., 1963, at
104, 106. New York retailers opposing the Truth in Lending Bill argued that passage
would only result in a reduction of overt fees and a hiding of credit charges in increased
prices. Hearings on S. 1740 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 239 (1962). A number of New York firms advertised free
credit. They obviously could not afford to do so unless credit charges were built into
their prices. Cf. Hearings on S. 750, supra note 6, at 209.
105. Hearings on S. 750, supra note 6, at 142-43, 146 (statement of Mrs. Gladys Dixon,
former credit investigator for a New Jersey firm); IN YOUR INTEREST, supra note 74, at
5; 111 CONG. REc. 16,426 (daily ed. 1965) (remarks of Senator Douglas).
106. THE POOR PAY MORE 92.
107. IN YOUR INTEREST, supra note 74, at 5. Most credit contracts are sold by merchants
to banks, finance companies, and other financing institutions. TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT
LEGISLATION 5-7.
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York City.108 Loan sharks, often charging as much as 1000 per cent a
year, continue to work and flourish in low income areas.10
These exorbitant rates, yielding profits far above the normal level," 0
continue to exist for several reasons:
(1) Many low income consumers do not and cannot engage in com-
parative shopping for either credit or loans."'
(2) Those who do so are more concerned with the size of the weekly
payments than with the total cost or interest that they will have
to pay.'"
(3) Low income consumers are often totally unaware of the interest
or the service charge which they are paying, either from a failure
to request it or because of a purposeful concealment by the
merchant.113
(4) Where any information is given it is usually the total credit
charge, as required by law, rather than the interest rate which
is much more important for comparative shopping?' 4
(5) Even those low income consumers who do feel that they are
paying excessive credit charges are not aware that a violation
of the law may be involved.
(6) Low income consumers are unwilling to endanger what may be
their only source of credit by complaining to the lender, let
alone to the law." 5
108. Hearings on S. 750, supra note 6, at 156 (over 50 per cent), 161 (100 per cent),
183 (55 per cent), 185 (168 per cent), 189 (54 per cent); III Cono. REc. 16,425.26 (daily
ed. 1965) (remarks of Senator Douglas; charges of 107 per cent and 143 per cent).
109. Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 6, at 170 (statement of David Borden, Director,
Block Communities, Inc.). See also Mobilization for Youth, Proposal for a Community
Program in Consumer Affairs 1 (June 1966) (on file in Yale Law Library); 111 Co.c. Rc.
15,850 (daily ed. July 12, 1965) (remarks of Senator Douglas, also suggesting that orga-
nized crime may be getting involved in the loan sharking business). The interest rates
charged by loan sharks vary widely. U.S. DEPT. or AGR1cuLnzt~, A GuwE To ButELTnNG
FOR THE FAMILY 13 (1965) (42 per cent to 1200 per cent).
110. Default rates in Harlem for example range from 5 per cent to 20 per cent, de-
pending on the merchant involved. THE POOR PAY MoRE 17 n.5; 2 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 1 n.1 (1966). Collection attorneys for Harlem merchants get default judgments in
97 per cent of the cases they bring, and successfully execute 75 per cent of their judgments.
Id. at 9 n.57, 10. Thus even the merchants with the highest default rates will recover
the money owed them in 74 per cent of their sales.
111. Equality in the Marketplace 7. See also Jordan & Warren, Disclosure of Finance
Charges: A Rationale, 64 MicH. L. REv. 1285, 1302-04 (1966); IN YOUR INizflEr, supra
note 74, at 6.
112. Hearings on S. 2755, supra note 31, at 113 (statement of William Kick); Tim
POOR PAY MORE 97 n.3.
113. Ross, supra note 104, at 104-05, 106. 114 U. PA. I. REv. 395, 411 (19R6; IN YoUm
INTmRasr, supra note 74, at 6-8; 111 CONG. R. 15,850 (daily ed. July 12, 1965) (remarks
of Senator Douglas).
114. IN YOUR INmarxsr, supra note 74, at 6.-115. Cf. Hearings on S. 750, supra note 6, at 492.
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(7) The penalty provision of the Retail Installment Sales Act in
New York is emasculated by a provision permitting the seller
to avoid all penalties if he reforms the contract in conformity
with the law within 10 days of written notice by the buyer of
the violation.116
Beside the credit charge itself, credit raises the costs of goods indi-
rectly in other ways. The unavailability of credit outside of the low
income area forces low income families to shop at the more expensive
stores.117 Banks encourage consumers who do have savings to borrow
for their purchases anyway in order to leave their savings "intact." 118
The remoteness of the ultimate payment for goods and services induces
low income consumers to spend more than they can afford. 119
Post-Sale Legal Conflicts
Existing legal institutions and practices fall far short of insuring rea-
sonable protection for the low income consumer.
Where the low income consumer is the potential plaintiff, it is most
unlikely that suit will even be brought. Most low income consumers
are unaware of the existence of either legal aid or the small claims
court and simply do not think in terms of invoking legal processes on
their side.120 Where the low income consumer is sufficiently irate to
take action, he is likely to stop payment as a form of pressure on or
retaliation against the merchant-and usually just worsen his own
position thereby.12' For those few who do attempt to invoke legal pro-
116. N.Y. PEas. PROP. LAw § 414(3) (1962).
117. E.g., THE POOR PAY MORE 98.
118. Bowery Savings Bank, How Much Will It Cost You to Borrow the Money for
Your Next Major Purchase? (reprint of an advertisement in New York City newspapers,
May, 1966; copy on file Yale Law Library). See, MARGOLIUS, supra note 82, at I. Borrowing
in such circumstances is not limited to the least astute consumers. Interview with a
chagrined student at the Yale Law School who asked that her name be withheld, In
New Haven, Feb. 20, 1967.
119. TE POOR PAY MORE 98; Hearings on S. 2755, supra note 31, at 102. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965). A survey
by a major finance company found that the likelihood of repossession increased as down
payments were lowered and repayment periods were lengthened; the more remote the
ultimate payment for the goods, the less likely a consumer would carefully weigh their
cost against his income. MARGOLsUS, supra note 82, at 18. Credit clearly facilitates im.
pulse buying. THE POOR PAY MoRE 59. Well aware of this fact low income area firms
advertise "instant," "one hour" and "immediate" credit, stressing for example that "You
can drive in one hour." See any N.Y. Daily News, e.g. Aug. 11, 1966, at 67.
Notwithstanding the problems resulting from the use of credit the federal government
continues to stress its advantages. E.g., GUIDE To BUDGETING FOR THE FAaULY, supra note
111, at 12. More seriously, welfare departments force their clients to buy on credit by
forbidding savings.
120. See generally THE PooR PAY MoRn 137, 171-75.
121. Id. at 173; Consumer Frauds, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 400 (1966). Some merchants
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cesses the obstacles that must be overcome are substantial: (1) The
merchant may have gone out of business (and re-entered under a new
name)- 2 2 (2) Legal aid societies may be reluctant to help because they
do not in general take plaintiffs' cases. (3) Private attorneys' fees would
often be so high as to eat up any possible gain.m (4) Alleged warranties
may not have been in writing. (5) Frequently written documents will
have been lost. 24
When merchants or finance companies wish to sue, rather than in-
voke extra-legal pressures,'2 5 the situation is very different; for them
the legal process is a broad and easy road to garnishment. Merchant-
initiated suits virtually never come to trial; the overwhelming majority
-97 per cent in the case of Harlem merchants120 -end in default judg-
ments because the defendant never answers the summons or complaint.
In most cases-legal aid attorneys estimate 75 per cent'27-this is
because the defendant never received the summons. The common pro-
cedure has come to be known as "sewer service."'9s
In the few instances where process is actually served on the defendant
it may still go unanswered, because he does not understand it, because
he is unwilling to take time off from work to go to court, because he
is afraid of all legal institutions, because he knows of no source of legal
help, or because he feels that he will lose anyway. Clearly none of these
reasons, except possibly the last, has anything to do with the usual
theories behind refusal to re-open most default judgments.
Once the default judgment has been obtained the merchant proceeds
as quickly as possible to garnishment of the defendant's salary. Often
repossession and/or attachment of the defendant's property may have
to precede garnishment, but the value of repossessed property usually
falls far short of the price, and the impoverished debtor rarely has
valuable property to attach.'29 As a result of sewer service, default judg-
ments, and failure to attach property, the defendant frequently first
appear aware that this is one of the main causes of defaults; a recent advertisement read
in part "Now give your credit a new lease on life. We believe in you. We believe . ..
that anyone who has received a 'fair shake' will make his payments faithfully." N.Y. Daily
News, Aug. 11, 1960, at 70.
122. See note 73 supra.
123. Consumer Frauds, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 499 (1966); Hearings on H.R. 7179,
supra note 6, at 191 (statement of Barnett Levy).
124. THE POOR PAY MORE 173-74.
125. See generally THE PooR PAY MORE 23-25; Buy Now, PAY LA'm 53-61.
126. 2 CoLUrd. J.L. & SoC. PROB. 9 (1966).
127. Id. at 10. Cf. 12 WIEsr REs. L. R v. 747 (1961).
128. Concerning the causes of sewer service, see generally 2 COLUn. J.L. & Soc. Panso.
1, 9-10 (1966).
129. Often neither repossession nor attachment are attempted. TitE Poor PAY MozE
189-90.
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hears of the proceeding against him when he is served with a notice
of wage garnishment.130 In some states the judgment debtor must be
notified before the garnishment is served, but in practice this is not
often done.131
The general effect of this system is to make the court system an in-
discriminate stamp for all creditor claims against the poor.
In addition to his original debt, the low income consumer who is
subjected to a default or other judgment will also be liable for sizeable
costs and attorney's fees. In New York for example, where these addi-
tions are limited more than in most states,' 32 the total costs and fees
on a debt of $100 will be $40 excluding interest. 33
The few low income consumers who do get a trial of their case may
find that most of their defenses, such as fraud by the seller or delivery
of the wrong goods, are unavailable because they are being sued, not
by the original merchant, but by a bank or finance company.134 Mer-
chants in both middle and low income areas commonly sell the cus-
tomer's promise to pay to a financing institution'35 in order to get
working capital and to avoid the trouble of collecting the debt them-
selves. In most states virtually no defenses are available against such a
"holder in due course."' 36 In a few states the buyer can raise against
the bank or finance company any defenses he could against the seller.137
However, another provision of these states' laws provides that the
debtor may be given 10 or 15 days after proper notice in which to
notify the finance company or bank of any mistake in the contract, of
nondelivery of the goods specified, or of any other nonperformance
by the seller. The consumer waives any defenses of which the holder in
due course has not been notified. In practice this second provision vi-
tiates the protection given by the first; consumers are unlikely to report
any such nonperformance or error, either because defects in the prod-
uct may not have yet appeared, or because they do not understand or
130. 2 COLUTm. J.L. & Soc. PROa. 1, 11 (1966); Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 6, at
191 (statement of Barnett Levy).
131. E.g., THE POOR PAY MORE 159-60; 2 COLUL. J.L. & Soc. PRoD. 1, 14 (1966).
132. See generally TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDrr LEGISLATION 170-72, 278-88, 311-23.
133. 2 COLUm. J.L. S. Soc. PROD. 1, 12-13 (1966).
134. This has become such a problem for poor consumers that stores on 125th St. In
Central Harlem have begun to put up signs reading "No finance companies; No banks."
See also the "Cars-a-poppin" ad, N.Y. Daily News, Aug. 11, 1966, at 66 ("No loan co.'s
involved.').
135. See generally TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 6 n.3.
136. Id. at 812-22, chart 19, cols. 1-3.
137. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1804.2 (West 1966 Cum. Supp.) (all goods), DEL. CODI ANN. tit.
6 § 4312 (West 1964 Supp.); REv. LAws HAwAii tit. 24, § 201 A-17(d) (1965 Supp.); N.Y,
PRs. PROP. LAW § 403(1) and (3) (1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73 § 500-208 (1965 Supp.).
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read the notice. 138 Only Oregon and Massachusetts adequately protect
consumers against such holders in due course.130
Problems of the Affluent
The affluent as well as the poor buy without asking prices,140 shop
for status' 4 ' or games' rather than value, purchase food on credit,
4 3
and do not know the cost of the credit they often use.144 The high
motivation assumed by the new consumer legislation is often lacking
among the middle classes. Advocates of the Truth-in-Lending Bill
argue for it on the ground that people do not know the cost of the
credit that they are using-but if those consumers really cared about
the cost they could often find out what it was by refusing, for example,
to complete an agreement until the cost and interest rate were stated. 45
138. 2 COLUM. J.L. g: Soc. PROB. 1, 6-7 (1966).
139. Omr. REv. STAT. § 83.650(1) and (2) (1963); ANN. LAws MiLss. ch. 255. § 12(c)
(1966 Supp.).
140. Hearings on HR. 7179, supra note 6, at 49 (statement of Professor R. T. Morris);
Peterson, Pennywise Teenagers, 2 ASmmCAN EDurAnoN 24 (April, 1966). "Food advertising
has swollen to such a volume that it has virtually eliminated price competition ...
Instead of competing through price, food processors compete through advertising, and
food retailers compete through showmanship, trading stamps, free parking, and Musak."
Dowling, To Market We Go . . . Like Lambs to the Slaughter, Nav REPuBLuc, Jan. 28,
1967, at 19, 22.
141. V. PAcKmAD, THE STATUS SramS 112-29 (1959).
142. Safeway, the second largest food retailer in the country, used "Bonus Bingo" to
raise its sales 14 per cent and its earnings 35 per cent during the first nine months of
1966. The game was dropped shortly after an FTC investigation of the practice was an-
nounced. A&P. also offers bingo, carefully controlling where customers will win so
as to spur sales in those stores where business has lagged. NEw Rs, unuc, Jan. 21, 1967,
at 10. Gasoline station advertisements have come to be dominated by references to games
like "All Pro" (American), "Tigerino" (Esso), "Batman" (Merit) and "Americana" (Shell).
143. PACKARD, supra note 141, at 121.
144. PREsmENTIAL MESSAGE ON CoNsUMER LEGISLATioN 2 (1962); AFL-CIO, IN Yot
INTERFsT 3 (undated). The problem is as common among well-to-do college graduates;
many of them believe that the cost of installment credit is under 6 per cent. BUY Now,
PAY LATER 77. See also Hearings on S. 750, supra note 6, at 13.1-35.
145. Advocates of informational bills try to rationalize this problem away:
Unfortunately, it is frequently very difficult for y-ou to find out the true cost of
what you pay to borrow money or to buy on an installment plan. You know how
it goes. You and the family really want that new TV or that late model automobile.
By the time you get to looking seriously, you want it and need it right then-not
later after you have taken the time to read the fine print in the sales contract. And
the salesman or loan official makes those small monthly payments sound like a
"breeze" to repay.
IN YOUR IrN7RnsT, supra note 144, at 3. The urgency of acquiring a new car or T.V. and
the smooth line of a salesman would hardly deter a hardened shopper at all interested
in the cost of buying on time; it usually doesn't stop him from linding out the price
of the car or television. Senator Douglas argued:
[l]t is claimed that most consumers do not care about interest rates. This claim is
directly contrary to the statements of many witnesses who related their sad experi-
ences before our committee. Many of these people said they never would have agreed
to a particular transaction if they had known the interest rate was as high as it
was .... The average person usually gives up when confronted with the problem
of computing a rate of interest from the meager information supplied by a fast
talking salesman, and accepts instead his bland assurance that the rate is the lowest
in town.
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Similarly Senator Hart stressed that Truth-in-Packaging legislation was
needed because college-educated shoppers told to get best buys and
given almost 2 minutes per item, still could not do so with consis-
tency.146 But elsewhere in the debates it became clear that housewives
were spending far less shopping time per item than this, perhaps 30
seconds or less.14 Clearly such consumers allow themselves no time to
compare prices among ten or twenty varieties; they simply grab their
"usual brand" and run.48 The proverbial slide rule' 4 which food shop-
pers would need to compare food prices has remained just that; no one
has suggested that shoppers do or should try to compute prices per
pound from available information, or to ask their grocer to do it for
them. Appliances, among which only an occasional engineer could
decide without detailed research, 160 annually sell in the tens of millions
while Consumer Reports sells hardly 950,000 issues 51t It seems clear
that the vast majority of the country does not exert itself to make in-
formed and rational purchasing decisions.
111 CONG. REc. 16,426-27 (daily ed. 1965). But consumers who really cared about Interest
rates would not accept those assurances. As for the difficulty of computing interest rates,
Senator Douglas stressed in the same speech that a 4¢ pocket-sized slide rule issued by
the Consumer Union Supply Co-operative would make the task a simple one. Id.
146. 112 CONG. REC. 12,169-72 (daily ed. June 9, 1966) (based on a study by Monroe
P. Friedman of Eastern Michigan University). The thirty-three subjects all had at least
one year of college and no less than a year of regular shopping experience. They missed
the best buys 43 per cent of the time, and as a result spent an average of 10 per cent
more than was necessary.
147. See the strangely ambivalent statement of Senator Magnuson on the Truth-in-
Packaging bill, 112 CoNG. REG. 11,507 (daily ed. June 2, 1966).
There is clear evidence that most consumers, most housewives, are not at all con-
fused in the supermarket. A comprehensive study of buying habits in supermarkets
showed that the average shopper sweeps past the 8,000 products found in the store
and buys 32 items in 15 to 18 minutes-hardly the pace of a confused shopper.
Hardly the pace of a shopper; this leaves less than one-ninth of a second per product If
comparisons are to be made.
148. Senator Hartke was exaggerating more than he knew when he remarked: "The
American consumer has developed an All-New, Low-Low Poly-Unsaturated disgust with
misleading packaging claims." 112 CONG. REC. 11,539 (daily ed. June 2, 1966). Similarly
Senator Hart oversimplified and overestimated the typical American consumer when
he said, "[W]hen the American consumer steps into the supermarket and swings his
cart into the aisle, he is undertaking a job that at first blush seems simple enough: He
wants to buy the maximum amount of what he wants and needs at the lowest possible
price." Id. at 11,543.
149. PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE ON CONSUMER LEGISLATION 4 (1966); Hearings on H.R. 15440
Before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1,
19 (also a computer and an M.I.T. graduate), 23 (also a note pad and a magnifying glass)
(1966); Hearings on H.R. 7179, supra note 6, at 53; 112 CoNG. REG. 12,211-12 (daily d.
June 9, 1966) (articles from the Houston Post). Other suggestions include a mathematical
whiz kid and a pocket-sized computer.
150. "Ninety per cent of the prescriptions written today are for drugs that were
unknown 20 years ago. Many of the new products used every day in the home are highly
complex. The housewife is called upon to be an amateur electrician, mechanic, chemist,
toxicologist, dietitian, and mathematician .... " PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE ON CONSUIER
IEGISLATION 2 (1962).
151. Consumer Frauds, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 449 n.448 (1966).
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The remedies proposed below will thus be of help to the average
American consumer as well as to the poor.
Legislative Remedies
The orthodox statutes already proposed and passed in a few states
are certainly worth enacting. The law should prohibit retail sales con-
tract provisions containing waivers of defenses, permission to breach
the peace to repossess, powers of attorney, acceleration of payments in
the absence of a default, legal fees for the merchant, a confession of
judgment, or extra credit charges 362 Balloon payments,10 add-on in-
stallment sales contracts5 4 and garnishment firings'3 should also be
forbidden. A Truth-in-Lending law and a stronger Truth-in-Packag-
ing statute 5 would certainly be of some use. However, those provisions
which are informational will only help a motivated and educated
minority, and the prohibitive features will not eliminate the principal
forms of abuse.
The most promising solution 57 as yet attempted for these problems
is consumer pressure on the retailers through community action. To
judge by the business community's outrage at the recent supermarket
boycott, such pressures are as painfully coercive as the worst bureau-
cratic interference with free enterprise. But for lasting success, com-
munity action requires greater motivation and stronger habits of group
cooperation than exist in most low-income areas. Moreover, many busi-
nesses are invulnerable to pickets or boycotts. One cannot, for example,
picket a peddler; each consumer will have to be convinced in advance
not to buy from him, and if that is done the result is not a boycott
but a permanent change in buying habits.
Because these techniques as well as existing forms of legislation are
inadequate to deal with the problems of low income consumers, a dif-
152. See generally TRENDS IN CoNsussasR CREDIT LEGISLATION.
153. See note 102 supra.
154. E.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
155. See note 6 supra.
156. The most logical and effective Truth-in-Packaging bill would simply require all
supermarkets and grocery stores to label every item with both the price and the cost perpound or per quart. It is obviously more efficient for the grocer to make the calculation
once than for each of his customers to make it for themselves, and the danger that even
facilitated computation will be too great an inconvenience for the consumers is avoided.
157. Augmented financial aid for the poor must be precluded from serious considera-
tion as a solution to these problems for a number of reasons, including the immense costs
involved. Hearings on H.R. 15140 Before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, 16, 20, 25 (1966). The cost of a regulatory program
is minute in comparison. Id. at 149; N.Y. Times, Feb. 17. 1967, at 24, col. 8 (1967 Presi-
dential fessage on Consumer Legislation).
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ferent type of legislative solution is suggested below. Although the stat-
ute is designed for state enactment, parts of it are adaptable to the
forms and limitations of city ordinances, FTC regulations, and federal
laws. The Act has two goals: (1) to restore competitive shopping con-
ditions in low income areas and increase the likelihood of sound shop-
ping practices by the poor; (2) where this is infeasible, to act directly
on prices and quality. To insure the effectiveness58 of the substantive
provisions of the Act, three avenues of enforcement are provided: (1)
state action in the form of prosecutions and suits for injunctions; (2)
legal weapons for community activists; (8) generous punitive damages
for the consumer on whom a merchant has employed an illegal tech-
nique.
AN UNFAIR SALES PRAcrIcEs Acr
§ 1. This Act may be cited as the [name of state]
Unfair Sales Practices Act.
§ 2. The State of declares it to be its policy in
158. Much heretofore enacted legislation had been crippled for want of effective en-
forcement provisions.
Some statutes do not provide for penalties, but only permit injunctions. E.g., N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW § 396 (Supp. 1966). FTC "prohibitions" of deceptive sales practices are vitiated
for this reason. Consumer Frauds, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 442-45 (1966). The FTC's
explanation of this limitation is vaguely reminiscent of the 1964 Republican Party plat-
form: "With this much authority [sic] for the FTC, you might wonder why the federal
government could not handle the entire job of protecting consumers from being cheated.
There are good reasons why it cannot, the principal one being that Congress never
intended to establish the huge Gestapo that would be needed to police every store and
salesman in the country. Not only would the cost be prohibitive but businessmen have
demonstrated that, with very few exceptions, they are quite capable of policing them-
selves." FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, FIGHT BACKI THE UNGENTLE ART or SELF DEFENsE
(undated). Notwithstanding adequate legal powers to prosecute, consumer fraud bureaus
are often content to stop an illegal practice or to mediate individual buyer-seller disputes.
33 U. CHI. L. REv. 590, 591 n.7 (1966). See N.Y. CONSUMtER FRAUDS AND PROTECTION
BUREAU, ANN. REP. 6-9 (1965). Although 43 states bar false statements in advertisements,
there are only 34 reported prosecutions under those laws, less than half of them successful.
See 56 COLUm. L. REV. 1018, 1058-64 (1956). Sometimes the laws themselves are almost
impossible to enforce. False promises, the most common form of fraud, are extremely
difficult to prosecute. Pearce, Theft by False Promises, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 967 (1953);
Seavey, Caveat Emptor as of 1960, 38 T-xAs L. REv. 439 (1960). Fraud by misleading
omission is also common and difficult to prosecute. Barber, Government and the Con-
sumer, 64 MiECH. L. REv. 1203-08 (1966). Perhaps the worst instance of an inherently
unenforceable statute is the New York Retail Installment Sales Act, section 414(3) of
which provides that where a non-complying contract provision is discovered, the seller
may avoid civil or criminal liability by correcting the non-complying provision within
ten days of notice from the buyer.
Even where these problems are absent, enforcement may in practice be nonexistent.
A determined executive with a reasonable law may be frustrated if the courts insist on
handing out minuscule fines. Interview with Hugh Marius, New York City Dept. of
Markets, in New York City, Aug. 8, 1966. See, e.g., N.Y. CONSUMER FRAUDS AND PRoTEcrIoN
BUREAU, ANN. RE'. 2 (1965) (average fine for a violation of city markets regulations was
$31); Consumer Frauds, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 427 (1966). Graft is always a problem.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1966, at 1, 29.
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enacting this Act to assure the consumers of the State a .fair return for
their money.
§ 3. Definitions
(a) "Person" means any individual, corporation, partnership, as-
sociation or other organized group of persons, or the legal
successor or representative of the foregoing.
(b) "Goods and services" shall include any and all goods and ser-
vices, including but not limited to personal property, real
property, automobiles, and leases, but excluding professional
services.
(c) A person is a "consumer" inasmuch as he purchases or rents
goods or services primarily for personal, family or household
purposes, rather than for business, including farm and pro-
fessional, purposes.159
(d) "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods or services or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having
knowledge or skill peculiar to the goods or services involved
in the transaction, or to whom such knowledge or skill may
be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or
other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out
as having such knowledge or skill peculiar to the goods or
services involved in the transaction, or to whom such knowl-
edge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an
agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation
holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.1c
(e) "Advertisement" means any statement, written or otherwise,
on radio or television, or in a newspaper, periodical, pam-
phlet, circular, telephone directory or other publication, or
on any sign, which reveals the existence of or gives any in-
formation about any merchant or any goods or services
thereof.
§ 4. Credit and Loan Charges
(a) No merchant shall charge or attempt to charge any consumer
for the sale of goods or services on credit a total credit charge,
including all investigating, insurance, set up, or other fees
not contingent on default, which exceeds 12% per annum.
159. Compare UNinO1M COm,,mRcAL CODE § 9-109 (1964).
160. Compare UNIFoM CO.MERCI.L CODE § 2-104(1) (1964).
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(b) Also deemed part of the credit charge shall be the difference
in any case between the retail price charged and the price
charged any other customer at that time for the same or
comparable goods or services, excluding sales to relatives or
employees of the merchant.
(c) No merchant shall arrange or help to arrange for loans for
his customers where the total charge for those loans is in
excess of what he could charge for credit under sub-
section (a).
(d) No lender shall charge or attempt to charge any consumer
an interest rate in excess of 36% per annum.
(e) No debt management service shall charge or attempt to
charge a fee in excess of 6% of the total payment received
by the debtor's creditors through the debt management
service.
Limitations on credit and loan charges are not uncommon. In most
states, however, the ceilings on loans are lower than those on credit
sales, thus forcing the bad credit risk to buy on credit, to risk above-
ceiling charges because of fees built into the price of the goods or
services involved, and to restrict his shopping to low income areas.101
The reverse is true under this section. Anyone who is such a bad risk
that a 12 per cent charge is not economically feasible will be forced
to get a loan instead of buying on credit. In particular, most of the
poor will have to use loans rather than credit. This is intended to
permit and encourage low income consumers to shop for durables
outside of their area, and perhaps to curb the irresponsible attitude
toward financial commitments born of signing credit contracts instead
of paying cash. Subsection (b) plugs the traditional loophole in credit
ceilings.
Debt management or pooling services, which are presently unregu-
lated in four out of five states, charge fees comparable to those for
loans and provide in their contracts that any money received from
their client must be used to pay the fee before being passed on to the
creditors.162 Subsection (e) limits the fee for a service of such dubious
value.
161. Extremely low limits on both credit and loan charges will give business to loan
sharks. See BuY Now, PAY LATER 150-78.
162. Id. at 142-44.
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§ 5. Price Tags and Lists
(a) Merchants shall place on or conspicuously near all goods on
display usually bought by consumers a tag or other label
clearly stating their price.
(b) The prices of any undisplayed goods commonly purchased
by consumers shall be conspicuously posted.
(c) No merchant shall sell goods or render services to any con-
sumer at prices other than those displayed or placed on price
tags, except that this provision shall not include sales to
employees or relatives of the merchant or to discounts be-
cause of the quantity of goods or services purchased.
(d) This section shall not apply to watches or jewelry with a
wholesale price in excess of $50.
This provision has three purposes. (1) Prevention of purposeful
exploitation to or inability to evaluate the price of basic consumer
goods. The merchant is forced to choose between pricing his goods
for the incompetent shoppers and driving the better ones away, or
pricing for the better shoppers and extending the benefit to all. A
compromise by the merchant will be of value to the poor shoppers
while still tending to drive away the others, thus producing pres-
sure on the merchant to lower his prices. (2) Enforcement of the maxi-
mum credit rate provision, serving to back up section 4(b) where
problems of proof or a feeling on the part of the merchant that he
could "get away with it" would otherwise lead to building credit
charges into varying prices. (3) Giving a notice of cost that will increase
the buyer's awareness of the actual cost of the goods or services, thus
aiding those who, from shyness, blind faith in the retailer, or an
unwillingness to show concern with cost, might otherwise fail to
inquire as to the price before buying.
Previous legislation requiring price tags or cost lists has generally
been of a narrow sort, aimed at specific businesses like hotels,'0
motels, 64 parking lots, 65 and new car dealers. 0  Although in some of
these statutes there is concern to protect car-driving consumers in
need of information in order to decide where to stop,10T the principal
163. E.g., Adams v. Miami Beach Hotel Ass'n, 77 So. 2d 465 (Fl. 1955).
164. E.g., Alper v. Las Vegas Motel Assn, 74 Nev. 135, 325 P.2d 767 (1958).
165. E.g., State v. United Parking Stations, Inc., 235 Minn. 147, 50 N.W.2d 50 (1951).
166. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1232() (1964), applied in United States v. Cummings, 184 F. Supp.
18 (WM.. Pa. 1960).
167. See notes 163-65 supra.
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goal is preventing the exploitation of the unwary. Such legislation
often covers situations where even the most knowledgeable and moti-
vated consumers need help; it is clearly very difficult to engage in
comparative shopping for parking lots or motels when this involves
each time parking one's car and making verbal inquiry. This section,
on the other hand, not only provides information where an ideal
middle class shopper could be relied on to get it for himself, but goes
beyond informational goals to the regulation of sales practices by
requiring the charging of a uniform price.0 8 Of course even "infor-
mational" statutes bar in effect if not in letter the charging of prices
greater than those stated.
§ 6. No merchant shall use differences of type, size, style, location,
lighting or color so as to obscure any essential information in any
advertisement or sign. Essential information includes but is not lim-
ited to any part of a price which exceeds by 10% or $10 that part of
the price in larger type also includes, but is not limited to, terms such
as "'and up" and "down" after a price. Such essential information shall
be deemed obscured if, but not only if, the type of such essential in-
formation is less than 1/2 the size of any provision or statement it mod-
ifies, or otherwise less than 1/3 the largest type in that advertisement.
Although there are numerous statutes barring "misleading" adver-
tisements, 69 these have not been construed to cover size discrepancies.
In a strikingly parallel problem area-signs on motels and hotels-
there are "similar size" regulations. 70 As with stores in low income
areas, a weary traveler's first choice of a hotel is likely to be his only
one. These regulations, however, are limited to the size of lettering
and do not specify the standards which will pass the rather vague
"similar size" test.' 71
§ 7. Notice of Wholesale Prices
(a) Merchants shall include on the section (5) price tag the
wholesale price of any item if the merchant sells the item
168. Cf. ALA. CODE tit. 2 § 425(2) (held in Alabama Independent Service Stations Ass'n
v. Hunter, 249 Ala. 403, 31 So. 2d 571 (1947) to be beyond scope of state police power and
therefore violative of Alabama state constitution).
169. See generally 56 COLUm. L. REv. 1018 (1956).
170. E.g., FLA. STAT. 509.201(2)(2) (1962), upheld in City Center Motel, Inc. v. Florida
Hotel 9- Restaurant Comm'n, 134 So. 2d 856 (Fla. 1961); Alper v. Las Vegas Motel Ass'n,
74 Nev. 135, 325 P.2d 767 (1958). Cf. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1966, at 43 (parking lot signs).
171. In City Center Motel, Inc. v. Florida Hotel & Restaurant Comm'n, 134 So, 2d
856 (Fla. 1961), the court held that the statute had been violated when the largest lettering
was visible from sixteen hundred feet, while the smallest, one-eighth the size, could only
be seen from within two hundred feet of the sign.
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(i) for more than one dollar and less than five dollars, and
the wholesale price is less than 33 1/3% of the retail price,
or
(ii) for more than five dollars and the wholesale price is
less than 50% of the retail price.
(b) In computing that wholesale price there shall be included a
sum equal to one and one half times the cost of any addi-
tional service being provided, such service not to include
any sales cost, general overhead, or any service traditionally
provided with goods of the sort in question.
(c) This section shall not apply to watches or jewelry with a
wholesale price in excess of fifty dollars.
Because of the political, economic and administrative difficulties
which such regulations would entail, the Act does not provide for
direct price controls. The notice requirement of this section is in-
tended to have the same sort of effect as direct regulations, on the
assumption that even the most inept shopper would be disgruntled to
learn that he was paying a 200 per cent markup. Since higher mark-
ups on items selling under one dollar, such as newspapers, are often
needed to make a reasonable profit, and since excesses on such items
are unlikely to do much harm, this section does not apply to goods
under that amount. For similar reasons a higher markup rate is tol-
erated for items selling for between one and five dollars.
§ 8. No merchant shall use any fraudulent scheme or technique to
sell or lease any good or service. Such prohibition shall include
but not be limited to:
(a) misrepresentation, by commission or omission, tacit or ex-
plicit, oral or written, including any label or advertisement,
of
(i) the price of the goods or services,
(ii) any reduction therein,
(iii) the nature or size or quality thereof,
(iv) any other material fact, or
(v) the nature of documents being signed;
(b) the purposeful delivery of goods other than those requested
or purchased. Refusal by the merchant to take back misde-
livered goods shall constitute prima tfacie evidence that the
misdelivery was purposeful.
Consumer frauds rarely result in criminal sanctions or civil liability,
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in part because the statutes do not clearly define the proscribed fraudu-
lent technique. 72 This section plugs that loophole, while later pro-
visions insure more effective enforcement than has heretofore been
typical.
§ 9. Bait Advertisements
(a) No merchant shall purposely use any advertisement to offer
any good or service when he does not intend to sell that good
or service, but intends to sell instead some other good or
service.
(b) The following173 shall constitute prima facie evidence of such
illegal intent:
(i) refusal to show, demonstrate or sell the good or service
offered in accordance with the terms of the offer,1 4
(ii) the disparagement by acts175 or words17 of the adver-
tised good or service, or of the guarantee, credit terms,
availability of service, repairs or parts, or of anything
in any other respect connected with that advertised
good or service,
(iii) the failure to have available at all outlets listed in the
advertisement a sufficient supply of the advertised good
or service to meet reasonably foreseeable demands,71
unless the exact quantity of available goods or services
and/or the unavailability of certain goods or services at
certain outlets is stated,
78
(iv) the refusal to take orders for the advertised merchan-
dise to be delivered within a reasonable period of time,
(v) the showing or demonstrating of an advertised product
or service which is known to be defective, unusable, or
unsuitable for the purpose represented or implied in
the advertisement,7
172. See note 158 supra.
173. In general subsection (b) follows the FTC "Guides Against Bait Advertising,"
2 TADE REG. REP. 7893 (1965).
174. E.g., People v. Glubo, 5 N.Y.2d 461, 158 N.E.2d 699, 186 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1959).
175. E.g., id.
176. E.g., id.; Electrolux Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 556, 161 N.E.2d 197 (1959):
People v. Levinson, 199 N.Y.S.2d 625, 23 Misc. 2d 483 (1960); National Home Food
Service Co. [1963-65 Transfer Binder] TRAE REG. REP'. 16,617 (FTC 1963).
177. E.g., Walter Zulawinski, [1948-52 Transfer Binder] TPADE REC. REr. 13,187
(FTC 1948); Robert W. Bailey, [1942-45 Transfer Binder] TR"E REo. REP. ; 13,201
(FTC 1945).
178. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-115(a) (1966 Supp.).
179. E.g., People v. Glubo, 5 N.Y.2d 461, 158 N.E.2d 699 (1959).
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(vi) the use of a sales plan or method of compensation for
salesmen or of any plan penalizing salesmen, designed
to prevent or discourage them from selling the adver-
tised product,80
(vii) the use of practices described in either (ii) or (v) after
the sale of the advertised goods in an attempt to sell
something else instead,'8'
(viii) failure to make a delivery of the advertised good or to
provide the advertised service within a reasonable time
after the sale, together with a failure to offer a rescis-
sion of the sale and a complete refund of any sum paid
by the consumer.
Although some form of "bait advertising" is banned in a number
of states8 and by the Federal Trade Commission,183 these prohibitions
have done little to curb the practice. In New York City, where bait
ads are barred by both the state and the FTC,'L4 such advertisements
continue to flourish. 8s Enforcement of the FTC prohibition has been
almost nonexistent; there has been only one case before the FTC in
the last two years, 80 and former FTC Commissioner and General
Counsel Kintner did not even mention this aspect in surveying the
Commission's advertisement regulations.187 State laws tend to go un-
enforced for several reasons. (1) State authorities, rather than looking
for violations, generally wait for consumer complaints. 88 (2) Con-
180. Typically salesmen get no commission if they sell the "bait" product. Electrolux
Corp. v. Val-Worth, Inc., 6 N.Y.2d 556, 161 N.E.2d 197 (1959); People v. Levinson, 199
N.Y.S.2d 625, 23 Misc. 2d 483 (1960).
181. E.g., People v. Glubo, 5 N.Y.2d 461, 158 N.E.2d 699 (1959).
182. Axuz. REv. STAT. ch. 10, § 44-1464 (1956) (no bait ads where the goods are adver-
tised at less than cost); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17044, 17030 (1960) (no bait ads where
the goods are advertised at less than cost); COLO. REv. STAT. ch. 55, § 55-2-12 (1954);
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 396 (1966 Supp.); UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 13.5-8 (1953); Wse.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 100.30(3) (1961) (no bait ads where the goods are advertised at less
than cost and the sale is thus injurious to fair competition).
183. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 7815, at 12,551 (FTC 1965).
184. Advertisements on New York City radio and television and in New York City
newspapers will be seen or heard in New Jersey, thus falling under the FTC's jurisdiction
as interstate commerce. Concerning the breadth of the "interstate commerce' limitation
see Bankers Securities Corp. v. FTC [1960-61 Transfer Binder] TwtDE REc. REP.
29,298, at 37, 645 (FTC 1961). aJJ'd, 297 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1961).
185. See note 80 supra.
186. Between September 1964 and September 1966. National Modernizers Inc., 3
TRADE REG. REP. 17,369, at 22,583 (FTC 1965).
187. Kintner, Federal Trade Commission Regulation of Advertising, 64 Mwtt. L. Rrv.
1269 (1966).
188. See, e.g., N.Y. BUREAU OF Coxsu.ER FRAUDS AND PRoTEcroN, ANN. R . (1965). Even
when violations are brought to their attention by consumer complaints these bureaus
are primarily concerned with mediating the consumer-merchant dispute, rather than in
prosecuting the violating party. Comment, Commercial Nuisance: A Theory of Consumer
Protection, 33 U. Cm. L. REV. 590, 591 n.5 (1966).
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sumers in these states do not realize bait advertisements involve a
violation of the law, and it is the rare consumer 80 who objects strenu-
ously if the advertised goods are "out" or if the merchant tries to sell
him something else instead. (3) Often the sanctions available against
violators are negligible. In New York, for example, the statute only
empowers the Attorney General to seek an injunction against bait
advertising,10 which he may not succeed in doing until countless vio-
lations have occurred. The Attorney General may also seek to have
the corporate charter (if there is one) revoked because of the advertise-
ment,191 but in many cases the owners of the corporation may have
been planning to dismantle it themselves,192 and they are quite free
to establish a new corporation at their convenience. Although it is
not possible to legislate governmental vigor, this Act does insure sub-
stantial sanctions for violations when found and provides for addi-
tional consumer incentive and knowledge essential to private and
public policing.
§ 10. Peddling
(a) In the case of any sale by means of peddling the buyer may.,
regardless of delivery, rescind the contract by written or oral
notice to the peddler or his firm if such notice (i) is received
no later than or (ii) made by means of a letter postmarked
no later than, (i) midnight on the next business day after
the sale was made, or (ii) midnight on the next business day
after the day on which the buyer is given the address to
which such notice can be sent or (iii) midnight on the next
business day on which the buyer is given a written notice
by the seller of his right to rescind, whichever is later. In
the case of goods delivered before or in spite of such notice,
the buyer shall not be subject to any liability for any use
or consumption of such goods occurring more than five
business days after the sale.
(b) No merchant shall, by means of door to door peddling, sell
any good or service on credit.
189. E.g., Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 251 Minn. 188, 86 NV.2d
689 (1957).
190. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 396(b) (1966 Supp.).
191. Lawrence Aluminum Indus., Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 20 Misc. 2d 789, 196 N.Y.S.2d 844
(Sup. Ct. 1960).
192. See note 73 supra.
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(c) Subsection (b) shall apply to any sale where the merchant
makes any demonstration of goods or services which are
or might be sold, or where a substantial part of the negoti-
ations leading to the sale, takes place in the home of the
consumer, except where:
(i) the customer has visited the merchant's place of business
and has assented to the use of his home in this manner,
or
(ii) the customer is unable without substantial inconveni-
ence to visit the merchant's place of business, and has
requested the use of his home for negotiations or
demonstrations without the merchant's solicitation of
that request.
The "Yankee Peddler" played an important role in the economic
growth of 18th and 19th century America, often being the only con-
venient source of manufactured goods for the rural population.103 As
early as 1835,194 however, state governments became concerned with
peddlers' activities and regulations were enacted. Early legislation was
particularly concerned with the fact that peddlers could "unfairly"
undersell local merchants, 95 because they had no fixed place of busi-
ness and were not subject to the same pressures: the need for goodwill
and the danger of lawsuits. The peddlers were thus thought to be
more likely to engage in unscrupulous and fraudulent practices.100
Other provisions regarding peddlers were prompted by the nuisance
they caused housewives, 197 their obnoxious ways of gaining entry to
the home,9 8 their failure to pay taxes in the area where they worked,103
193. J. DOLAN, TsrE YANxK. PEDDLERS oF EARLY A.ewc& 10 (1954); see generally id.,
passim.
194. Cf. Higby v. People, 5 Ill. (4 Scam. 165 (1843) (involving an 1835 statute regulat-
ing dock peddlers).
195. ARn. STAT. ANN. § 84-2401 (1960). Cf. Hall-Omar Baking Co. %. Commissioner of
Labor & Indus., 344 Mass. 695, 701-02, 184 N.E.2d 344, 348-49 (1962 ; Town of Sellersburg v.
Stanforth, 209 Ind. 229, 239, 198 N.E. 437, 441-42 (1935); Simo)-an v. Rohan, 36 Ind. App.
495, 500, 76 N.E. 176, 178 (1905).
196. Simoyan v. Rohan, 36 Ind. App. 495, 76 N.E. 176 (1905); Commonwealth v.
Crowell, 156 Mass. 215, 30 N.E. 1015 (1892). City of Shreveport v. Cunningham, 190 La.
481, 182 So. 649 (1938); cf. Arm STAT. ANN. § 84-2401 (1960). See generally, Saw)er,
Federal Restraint on the States Power to Regulate House.to.House Selling, 6 Rocm"
MT. L. REv. 85, 87 (1934).
197. See McCormick v. City of Mrontrose, 105 Colo. 493. 99 P.2d 969 (1939); DeBerry
v. City of aGrange, 62 Ga. App. 74, 8 S.E.2d 146 (1940); Town of Sellersburg v. Stanforth,
209 Ind. 229, 239, 198 N.E. 437, 441-42 (1935). Compare 96 JusT. P. 600 (1932).
198. Sawyer, supra note 196, at 87; 96 JusT. P. 600 (1932).
199. A~m STAT. ANN. § 84-2401 (1960).
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the inherent objectionableness of using the public highway as a place
of business, 200 and the possible connection between door-to-door ped-
dling and burglaries.
20 1
The resulting legislation took a great variety of forms. Peddlers were
at times prohibited,20 2 licensed,2 0 3 subject to a deliberately burdensome
license fee,2 0 4 forced to submit to a character test,2 0 5 compelled to put
up sizeable bonds to pay taxes and civil judgments 00 and even had
the times when and places where they could work limited.20 7 Occa-
sionally regulations or prohibitions were directed at the peddling of
specific goods where abuses were felt to be especially likely or dan-
gerous.20  With the exception of some of the blanket prohibitions
enacted to protect privacy209 and of legislation discriminating against
nonresident peddlers,210 these statutes were widely upheld.
This section of the Act is concerned with three aspects of peddling:
(1) High Pressure Tactics: Although high pressure tactics are not
limited to peddlers, they are especially effective against a lone
housewife trapped in her own home. It is far easier to walk out
of a store when faced by an overzealous salesman than to talk
an obstinate peddler into leaving one's living room,211 and, un-
like store salesmen, peddlers can return at their convenience to
pursue the course of brainwashing begun at an earlier time.
A general restriction on peddlers is needed since problems of
200. See Commonwealth v. Fox, 218 Mass. 498, 106 N.E. 137 (1914).
201. 96 JusT. P. 600 (1932).
202. See, e.g., Rowe v. City of Pocatello, 70 Idaho 343, 218 P.2d 695 (1950); McCormick
v. City of Montrose, 105 Colo. 493, 99 P.2d 969 (1939); City of Shreveport v. Cunningham,
190 La. 481 (1938) (all upholding such statutes).
203. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 611 (1958); MASS. ANN. LAWs ch. 101, § 3 (1954).
204. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. § 42-1136 (1956) ($200 per county per year for a peddler
using a car); ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 611 (1958) ($100 per county per year for peddlers of
medical supplies); IDAHO CODE § 31-1303 (1963) ($300 per county per year for a peddler
using a car). See Ex parte Heylman, 92 Cal. 492, 28 P. 675 (1891) (upholding a $300.pcr-
year fee for meat peddlers when vegetable peddlers paid only $40 per year).
205. E.g., Asuz. REv. STAT. § 42-1136 (1956).
206. E.g., ARK. STAT. § 84-2406 (1960) ($500 for fees and taxes, $1000 for penalties for
fraud against the public); IDAHO CODE §§ 31-1303, 1306 (1963) ($500 for taxes and tort
and contract judgments arising from business in the county); MAsS. ANN. LAWS ch. 101,
§ 3 (1954) ($500 for fines, penalties, and civil judgments).
207. See Commonwealth v. Fox, 218 Mass. 498, 106 N.E. 137 (1914).
208. E.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 63-1019(d) (1962) (eye glasses, eye examinations and all
optometric services); MASS. ANN. LAw s ch. 101, § 16 (1954) (jewelry, furs, wines and
liquors, small artificial flowers, miniature flags); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2501 (19N3)
(contraceptives).
209. E.g., City of Osceola v. Blair, 231 Iowa 770, 2 N.W2d 83 (1942); City of Mt.
Sterling v. Donaldson Baking Co., 287 Ky. 781, 155 S.W.2d 237 (1941); DeBerry v. City of
LaGrange, 62 Ga. App. 74 (1940). For comment on the constitutional problems see Sawyer,
supra note 196.
210. E.g., Ex parte Deeds, 75 Ark. 542, 87 S.W. 1030 (1905).
211. Cf. THE POOR PAY MORE 143.
780
Consumer Legislation
definition and proof would make a provision directed at high
pressure tactics2'- unenforceable if not incomprehensible.
(2) Inconsistency with the Principle of Comparative Shopping: The
inherent incompatibility of peddling with the idea that con-
sumers should "shop around" before buying was explained years
ago by no less a friend of the peddling industry than the founder
and president of the Fuller Brush Company. Speaking of a sort
of consumer who is regrettably rare in even middle income areas,
A. C. Fuller remarked:
The American housewife is an intelligent buyer, no
matter what some folks say about her much-heralded ex-
travagance. The greatest safeguard she has in buying-and
she knows this very well-is in shopping around from store
to store, comparing values and styles and all the other
salient points.
This shopping impulse arises the moment she considers
buying anything, and the house-to-house salesman must
stifle it, if he can. He is giving his customer no opportunity
to compare values or to postpone buying. "Do it now," he
tells her, "I won't be back this way for a couple of months."
She buys, when she buys, against an inner voice of discre-
tion which tells her to wait until she can compare values.213
The Act will provide protection for the majority of housewives
for whom that voice has grown soft or been silenced altogether.
(3) High Peddler Prices: The level of peddler prices resulting from
high pressure tactics, lack of comparative shopping, and delib-
erate exploitation is described above. To the limited extent that
the higher prices represent payment for conveniences such as
the avoidance of dealing with unfamiliar salesmen, the policy
of the Act is that these are conveniences which most people,
particularly the poor, simply cannot afford, and which, in any
case, are impossible to distinguish administratively from the
other factors causing the high price levels.
The subsection (a) "cooling off period" is similar to laws already in
force in Massachusetts -14 and the United Kingdom.215 It differs from
212. But cf. 79 HARv. L. REv. 1299, 1300 (196).
213. Fuller, Where Are We Headed in House-to-House Selling?, 52 M.oAzm=,E oF
Busrnmss 703, 705 (1927), quoted in part in Sawyer, supra note 196, at 92. See the same
problem as viewed from a non-business perspective in Some Notes on Selling (And
Buying): In-the-Home Nuisances, 20 CONSUM ER RErORTs 435 (1955).
214. Mass. Retail Installment Sales and Services Act, § 9(D)(6), IA C.C.H- INsrAL.
Cumrr GUmE (fass.) 1162, at 27,775 (1966).
215. Hire-Purchase Act 1964, ch. 53, §§ 4-9.
781
The Yale Law Journal
them in two respects: (1) the cooling off period cannot begin until
the buyer knows where he ran reach the seller to notify him of the
rescission, and (2) it destroys any incentive the seller might have to
deliver the goods despite the subsection in the hope of collecting their
price because the consumer did not know his rights. Even so modified
this sort of provision will not be sufficient by itself to protect the poor
from peddlers. It deals with a very limited sort of problem: the
peddler's use of a sales technique which will wear off within the length
of time provided for cooling off. But the opportunity provided for a
fast-moving consumer to rescind his contract will often not be used by
the more undermotivated and ill-informed of the poor. The provision
does not deal with several of the principal causes of excessive peddler
prices. It is most unlikely that in the cooling off period many con-
sumers will come to dislike their "friend" the peddler, to find another
source of easy credit, or to discover by comparative shopping that simi-
lar goods can be purchased elsewhere for less.
Because of the limited value of provisions such as subsection (a),
stronger measures are needed. Since most door-to-door sales to the
poor are on credit, this is added by the subsection (b) prohibitions
against credit sales by peddlers.
The section is designed to minimize the interference with unobjec-
tionable door-to-door methods. Cash sales predominate in middle in-
come area peddling; neither of the two largest firms engaged in "direct
selling" offers credit.216 Subsection (c) is designed to include certain
operations of firms, 21 7 particularly large department stores, 218 in both
middle and low income areas; consumers are encouraged to engage in
comparative shopping by being forced to visit a firm before they can
obtain from it a "home demonstration." In some cases this will render
such a demonstration, with the attendant risk of high pressure tactics,
unnecessary, at least from the consumer's point of view.
§ 11. No merchant shall include in any advertisement any informa-
tion concerning the size of credit or down payments, or the
date on which credit payments will begin, unless he also
specifies:
216. Cf. Freegood, Avon: The Sweet Smell of Success, 70 FORTUNE 108 (1964); Fuller's
Twist on Door-to-Door, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 8, 1956, at 52.
217. E.g., in People v. Glubo, 5 N.Y.2d 461, 186 N.Y.S.2d 26 (1959) the customers
phoned for a home demonstration in response to television advertisements.
218. On the origins of department store involvement in "direct selling," see Some
Notes on Selling (And Buying): In-the-Home Nuisances, 20 CONSUbtER RErorxs 435 (1955).
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(a) The cost of the credit, in terms of simple annual interest,
(b) The total cash cost of the credit for any advertised good or
service, and
(c) The total cost, including the credit costs, of any good or
service which the advertisement states or implies can be
bought on credit.
If, in the case of (a), (b) or (c) there is a range of costs, the merchant
shall specify both the upper and lower limits of that range, and shall
not emphasize the lower limit.
Since low income consumers have a strong tendency to buy at the
first store they enter, in part because of the high pressure techniques
of salesmen, the criteria by which that first store is chosen are crucial.
If the store is picked because of the "ease" of its credit terms, a pur-
chase is likely regardless of the price or quality offered. If, however,
the store is chosen because it advertises low prices, there is not likely
to be a sale unless the right credit terms are offered. This section is
designed to increase the chance that the consumer will get more than
just easy credit terms by helping him to choose the first store he visits
(to the extent that he is choosing by signs or advertisements) by some
fact about the store or its goods and services other than easy credit
terms.
There is some precedent for regulating the content of advertisements
and signs in order to affect which stores or offices people decide to
patronize and why. Commonly, advertising by members of the medi-
cal profession, including dentists,219 and especially optometrists,220 is
strictly regulated. Particularly frequent are prohibitions against pub-
licizing prices.221 Like the problem of prices and credit, this is an area
where the first "merchant" chosen is likely to be patronized, at least
for a while; the policy of these statutes is that while price, like credit
in most retail sales, is certainly important, it can be relied upon to take
care of itself while the law helps people choose their optometrist, etc.,
on the more important ground of professional ability.-2 Statutes bar-
ring price advertisement also frequently bar advertising credit2 3 and
219. Cf., e.g., Donohue v. Andrews, 150 Ore. 652, 47 P.2d 940 (1935).
220. LA. RxV. STAT. ANN § 37:1061(14) (1964), interpreted in Akin v. Louisiana State
Bd. of Optometry Exam., 150 So. 2d 807 (La. 1963).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 813: "The obvious purpose of this prohibition is to prevent 'bait' adver-
tising, whereby prospective customers are attracted to an optometrist for reasons other
than his professional ability."
223. See note 220 supra.
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have been held to prohibit even a reference to "convenient credit
terms." 22
4
§ 12. Violation of this Act shall constitute a misdemeanor. The
violator shall be fined up to (i) 51000 or (ii) the price charged for all
goods and services sold in violation, or (iii) twice the total loss suffered
by the consumers affected, whichever is greater, but no less than twice
the loss suffered by the consumers affected. The loss suffered shall
equal the sum of the difference between the price paid by each affected
consumer for the goods and services involved and the fair market value
of those goods and services.
The minimum fine clause is provided to prevent emasculation of
the Act by permissive courts, and to insure that violations if discovered
are not profitable.
§ 13. Injunctions
(a) On proof by (i) a consumer in the area, (ii) a consumer
affected by the violation, (iii) a merchant in the area, (iv) a
merchant affected by the violation, or (v) the Attorney Gen-
eral, of a continuing violation of this Act, an injunction shall
be issued by any court of competent jurisdiction at the re-
quest of any such party prohibiting such violation. Such
injunction shall issue without proof of irreparable injury.
(b) On proof by (i) a consumer in the area, (ii) a consumer
affected by the advertisement, (iii) a merchant in the area,
(iv) a merchant affected by the advertisement, or (v) the At-
torney General, of a false or misleading advertisement, an
injunction shall be issued by any court of competent juris-
diction at the request of any such party, providing that
the merchant responsible for such advertisements shall
obtain at his own expense advertisements which
(i) admit the false or misleading nature of the earlier
advertisements,
(ii) correct the misinformation in those earlier advertise-
ments,
(iii) are of sufficient number and duration to obtain pub-
licity at least as great as that obtained by the earlier
advertisements, and
224. Louisiana State Bd. of Optometry Exam. v. Pearle Optical, 177 So. 2d 164 (Li.
1965).
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(iv) are of a type as similar as possible to the earlier
advertisements.
An injunctive remedy has been provided for in other consumer
legislation both at the request of the state2-5 and at the request of any
party being injured.220 Ignorance, failure to bring suit, limited violator
resources and problems of proof will always keep the forfeiture pro-
vision (infra) from righting all wrongs committed in violation of this
Act. Where fear of punishment is not enough to prevent such vio-
lations, injunctions should be available and used whenever possible.
§ 14. Licenses and Charters
(a) Violation of any part of this Act shall constitute sufficient
basis for
(i) revocation or denial of, or refusal to renew, any license
related to business activity in the course of which the
violation occurred,
(ii) dissolution or refusal to renew the charter of any cor-
poration in the course of whose business the violation
occurred, or
(iii) refusal to grant a corporate charter to a firm largely
staffed and/or controlled by persons guilty of a previ-
ous such violation,
by the authority empowered to issue, deny, dissolve, revoke
or refuse to renew such charter or license.
(b) Conviction of violation shall be conclusive proof thereof for
purposes of this section, but the violation may be proved
in the absence thereof. Acquittal of an alleged violation
shall not bar the appropriate authority from finding a vio-
lation and affecting any charter or license accordingly.
(c) In determining whether to take the action authorized in
subsection (a), the authorities concerned shall consider:
(i) the accidental or purposeful nature of the violation,
(ii) the amount of injury caused by the violation,
(iii) the extent to which the party committing the violation
has voluntarily remedied any such harm,
(iv) the number and nature of any previous violations by
the violating party, and
225. See note 158 supra.
226. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964).
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(v) the likelihood of repetition by the violating party of
the same or other violations of the Act.
Denial or suspension of licenses or corporate charters has been widely
used to supplement penalty provisions in other laws. In New York,
where the original "bait advertisement" law only provided for an
injunctive remedy, the Attorney General has used it to obtain revo-
cation of corporate charters.227 Unfortunately charter revocation is
only an effective deterrent against reputable firms unlikely to violate
the law anyway; corporations of a less certain character are frequently
dissolved anyway, its owners often returning to business with a new
corporation and a new name.228 For such cases the section makes diffi-
cult the acquisition of a new charter by persons involved in earlier
violations.
§ 15. Civil Remedies
(a) Except as provided below, in the case of any sale or loan
involving or resulting from a violation of any provision of
this Act, the goods and/or services in the case of a sale, and
the total amount of any loan, shall be forfeited to the buyer,
and any payments for such goods, services and/or loan shall
be returned to the buyer.
(b) Holders in Due Course
(i) In a suit by a holder in due course against a buyer, the
buyer may join the merchant if the buyer has a claim
against the merchant arising out of a sale pursuant to
which the note being sued upon by the holder in due
course was executed.
(ii) If both the buyer and the holder in due course succeed
in their claims,
(1) the buyer shall only be liable to the holder in due
course to the extent that the judgment of the holder
in due course exceeds that of the buyer,
(2) the merchant shall only be liable to the buyer to
the extent that the buyer's judgment exceeds that
of the holder in due course,
227. People v. Abbott Maintenance Corp., 11 App. Div. 2d 136, 201 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1960);
Lawrence Aluminum Indus., Inc. v. Lefkowitz, 20 Misc. 2d 739, 196 N.Y.2d 844 (1960).
228. See note 73 supra.
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(3) the merchant shall be liable to the holder in due
course for the amount of the judgment in favor
of the holder in due course or for the amount of
the buyer's judgment, whichever is less.
(iii) If for any reason the buyer cannot with reasonable ef-
fort join the merchant in accordance with section
15(bXi), any defense which the buyer would have
had against the merchant may be raised against the
holder in due course.
(c) In the case of advertisements in violation of section 9(b)(iii)
(bait advertisements, too few of advertised goods or services
available), any disappointed customer who came to the place
of business shall be entitled to the difference between the
advertised price and the going rate for the goods or services
advertised.
(d) In the case of violations of section 6 (price tags) this section
shall only apply where either
(i) the buyer was charged more than 10 per cent or 10
dollars more than the price tag or posted price, or
(ii) the buyer was charged at least 10 per cent or 10 dollars
(whichever is less) more than another buyer other than
an employee or relative of the merchant or quantity
purchaser.
(e) In all cases where the buyer or offeree successfully invokes
this section, either as a defense, counterclaim, or an inde-
pendent cause of action brought by himself, he shall be
entitled to reasonable costs and attorney's fees.
) The right of any person to bring suit under the terms of
this Act or to recover reasonable costs or attorney's fees
shall not be affected by his failure to raise that right by
way of a counterclaim or cross-claim in any earlier suit
brought against him in which a default judgement was
entered against him.
(g) Previous convictions
(i) A previous conviction or plea of guilty or nolo con-
tendere by the merchant shall constitute conclusive
proof in any civil suit brought under this section of the
violation alleged in the indictment.
(ii) In the event of such a conviction or plea the Attorney
General shall notify any consumer whose rights may rea-
sonably be expected to be affected thereby of such plea
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or conviction and of the possible right to damages avail-
able to such consumer.
(h) In the event of a conviction involving a court finding of a
pattern or practice of violation, the Attorney General may
post a notice thereof in any place of business of the mer-
chant where such violation was shown to have occurred.
Such notice shall state the violation of which the merchant
was convicted and the effect of that conviction on the rights
of his customers. Such notice shall remain posted no longer
than is reasonably necessary to assure that most of the af-
fected customers will see it and in no case longer than six
months.
(i) The Attorney General shall publicize the existence of this
section and of the rest of this Act.
There are four basic reasons for this section: 22 (1) Because of govern-
ment laxness or graft the criminal provisions may tend to go unen-
forced for want of a significant effort to put them into effect. (2) In
many cases where effective enforcement would be impossible without
consumer cooperation, there are substantial deterrents to such cooper-
ation. This section will alter that situation. (3) The forfeiture will have
a significant deterrent effect, one which cannot be emasculated by a
court's unwillingness to mete out substantial punishment for viola-
tions.230 (4) Any form of consumer protection policed only by the
government will suggest to low income consumers that their problems
are for the government to solve. Giving consumers a policing role will
increase their motivation for both improved personal shopping habits
and community action techniques.
Under some existing laws, sales and loans in violation of consumer
protection legislation are unenforceable.2 31 The principle is carried
over in subsection (a) with one significant modification. Under similar
provisions or case law the consumer is only protected to the extent that
the merchant is prevented from collecting more money. The con-
sumer's rights are made to depend on the basically irrelevant factor of
when he happened to default and force the merchant to take him to
court. It is unjustifiable that the extent of the consumer's protection
229. Compare S. 2755, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7(a) (1965).
230. See note 158 supra.
231. See, e.g., TRENDS IN CONSUMER CREDIT LEGISLATION 15 & n.7; UNIFORM COsMNtR.
CIAL CODE § 2-302(1) (1962); Rash v. Farley, 91 Ky. 344, 15 S.W. 862 (1891), 111 CONo.
Rac. 15,849 (daily ed. July 12, 1965) (remarks of Senator Douglas; a Babylonian forfeiture
provision dating from the 19th century B.C.).
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and the merchant's civil liability should vary so widely and so gratui-
tously.
In the absence of subsection (b) there would in each case be two
suits; the holder in due course would get his money from the consumer,
who would in turn sue the merchant. Subsection (1) avoids such a
multiplicity of suits by a liberal joinder rule, and also protects the
consumer who might otherwise be without effective remedy against
either the holder in due course or the merchant.2 2 The effect of the
subsection will be to shift back through the financing institution to
the merchant the ultimate risk of the merchant's failure to live up to
agreements within the confines of the law.
Generally the advertisements of a retail merchant are not regarded
in contract law as offers, but as invitations to bargain; - 3 there have,
however, been cases where an advertisement was held to constitute an
offer.2 4 In many cases the advertisement is so construed where the ac-
ceptance involves more than a verbal assent, such as when the offeree
makes a purchase upon which the offer is conditioned. There are also
cases holding an advertisement to constitute an offer where the offeree
only appeared at the store and tendered the purchase price.5 This
latter point of view seems more sensible, since in the case of most retail
advertisements there is nothing to "bargain" about, and it is followed
in subsection (c). To talk of "invitations to bargain" in such cases is
to overextend notions appropriate to non-consumer transactions. Since
the purpose of section 9(b)(iii) is to prevent stores from luring custom-
ers into the place of business with one offer and then selling them
something else, this subsection only applies where the customer actu-
ally comes to the place of business. The limitation also reflects a con-
cern to compensate the customer, albeit generously, for his trip to the
store, but not to do so for the negligible inconvenience of a telephoned
"acceptance." The provision's measure of damages follows the common
law, according to which timely acceptance of an offer entitled the
offeree on default to the difference between the market value and the
advertised price.236
232. See note 136 supra.
233. 1 A. CoRBiN, CoNTRAcrs § 25, at 75 n.16 (1950).
234. Johnson v. Capital City Ford Co., 85 So. 2d 75 (La. App. 1956) (offeree purchased
a 1954 Ford after offeror promised to exchange a 1955 Ford for a 1954 Ford purchased
within a limited period); Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co., I QB. 1256 (1893) (offerec
purchased a smoke ball after an offer by the manufacturer to pay £100 to anyone catching
influenza after using the smoke ball).
235. Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, 2551 Minn. 188, 86 N.W.2d 689
(1957) (a $139.50 stole advertised for $i) and cases cited 251 Minn. at 190-91, 86 N.W.2d
at 691.
236. Id. 251 Minn. at 189, 86 N.V.2d 690; RESTATEMEtN" OF Co.TR-cts § 329, com-
ment b, at 504 (1933).
789
The Yale Law Journal
As a general rule attorney's fees are not given in the United States
in the absence of a special court rule, statute, or valid contract pro-
vision.2 37 In order to facilitate private suits a number of statutes do
give plaintiffs such fees, either in all cases arising under the statute238
or according to the discretion of the trial judge.239 Subsection (c) is
most similar to the mandatory reasonable attorney's fees provision of
the Clayton Act,240 where private suits are encouraged to help enforce
the more general commands of the statute.241 There is clearly no reason
to limit such fees to cases where the consumer is the plaintiff, partic-
ularly as this would encourage a multiplicity of suits.
Subsection (f) is intended to solve the problem of sewer service and
default judgments generally in cases where the merchant has violated
the Act by enabling the consumer to acquire a judgment against him
of at least an equal amount. However, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure242 and the rules of sixteen states243 provide that counterclaims
arising from the facts underlying a suit must be raised at that suit or
be lost. Five other states prohibit the defendant who failed to raise
such a counterclaim from collecting costs in a later suit.244 In view of
the extensive problem of default judgments in suits involving the poor,
the purpose of the section would largely be defeated if such default
judgments would bar any civil claims arising from violations of the
Act in the sale on which the default judgment was obtained.
Subsection (g) follows the federal anti-trust laws and is included to
encourage and facilitate private suits.
§ 16. No waiver of rights created by this Act shall be binding upon
any party, regardless of whether the alleged waiver was in writing or
for consideration.
§ 17. Nothing in this Act shall be construed as to impair or affect
any contract, agreement or negotiable instrument existing or any
237. 6 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 54.77 [2] (2d ed. 1965).
238. E.g., Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930 § 7c, 7 U.S.C. § 499g(c)
(1964); Interstate Commerce Act § 16(2), 49 U.S.C. § 16(2) (1964); Clayton Act § 4, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
239. E.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1964); Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77www(a) (1964); Fair Labor Standards Act § 16(b), 29 U.S.C.
§ 216(b) (1964).
240. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
241. See generally Comment, Section 5 of the Clayton Act and the Nolo Contendere
Plea, 75 YALE L.J. 845 (1966).
242. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a).
243. Wright, Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern Plead.
ing, 38 MINN. L. REV. 423, 424-26 (1954).
244. Id. at 426-27.
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events occurring before, or to create any cause of action or criminal
liability because of events taking place entirely prior to the effective
date of this Act.
§ 18. The provisions of this Act shall only apply to transactions in-
volving advertisements directed to consumers, except that the Act shall
apply to any buyer or offeree regardless of the purpose to which he put
or intended to put the goods or services offered or sold where that
buyer was not prior to his first contact with the seller or offeree en-
gaged in a business to which the goods and services were directly
related.
The idea that complete freedom of contract will generally lead to
equitable agreements makes substantial sense, if anywhere, only within
the business community, where bargaining power is more equally dis-
tributed, de facto monopolies less common, and buyers and lessors
generally both more motivated and better informed than is the case
when consumers are involved.2 5 This generalization cannot, however,
be extended to the individual who first evinces an interest in some line
of business in response to the advertisements or solicitations of a mer-
chant who hopes to sell him the "necessary" equipment or franchises.
Thus in People v. Abbott Maintenance Corp.,240 the defendant enticed a
large number of people to his place of business in the guise of offering
opportunities for employment in floor waxing, and having gotten them
there proceeded instead to enter into a large number of installment
contracts for the sale of waxing machines worth $102.90 for $936.
Abbott took no further part in the "business" of floor waxing, and the
machines were inadequate for the commercial purposes for which they
were sold. Such cases are not uncommon2- 7 and clearly should fall
under the protection of the Act.
§ 19. Attorney General Reports and Studies
(a) The Attorney General shall annually submit a report to the
legislature detailing:
(i) the efforts that have been made at enforcing the provi-
sions of this Act,
(ii) the number and outcome of civil and criminal suits
245. See the special treatment of transactions "between merchants" in the UNironm
COMMERCIAL CODE (1958).
246. 11 App. Div. 2d 136, 201 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1960).
247. See, e.g., N.Y. CONSUNMr FRAUDS AND P.OrcON BUREAU, ANN. REP. 8 (1965).
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brought or reaching conclusion during the year and
involving violations of this Act,
(iii) efforts done to publicize the provisions of this Act
among merchants and consumers,2 48 and
(iv) recommendations of any additional legislation needed
to protect and assist the consumers of this state.240
(b) From time to time the Attorney General shall conduct stud-
ies to determine the extent to which consumers, especially
those of limited means, are aware of their rights under this
Act.
§ 20. Nothing in this section shall apply to any television or radio
broadcasting station, or to any publisher or printer of a newspaper,
magazine or other form of printed advertising, or sign maker, who
broadcasts, publishes, or prints advertisements or makes signs which
constitute or are part of a violation of this Act, unless such person has
actual knowledge of the violation.
250
§ 21. Repeal
(a) ... and all Acts and parts of Acts whether general, special or
local, which relate to the same subject matter as this Act, so
far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act,
are repealed.
(b) Notwithstanding any previous laws to the contrary, the At-
torney General may effect such modification in the organiza-
tion of the Department of Justice as he deems will substan-
tially aid the enforcement of this Act.
§ 22. If any clause, sentence, section, provision, or part of this Act
shall be adjudged to be unconstitutional or invalid for any reason by
any court of competent jurisdiction, such judgment shall not invalidate,
impair or affect the remainder of this Act, which shall remain in full
force and effect.
248. See statement of Miss Gladys Aponte, supra note 48.
249. Compare CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12050-57 (West, 1963); Consumer Frauds, 114
U. PA. L. REV. 395, 431 (1966); Draft of Executive Order Establishing a New York City
Council on Consumer Affairs, § 5(g), March 1967, on file in Yale Law Library.
250. Compare N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 396(1) (Supp. 1966).
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